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“A man like me,” Nicolae Ceauşescu told his health minister in the 1970s, “comes along only once every five hundred years.”​[1]​ This will surely be a relief for the Romanians. Although Ceauşescu referred to the period of his rule as the ‘Golden Age’ or the ‘Epoch of Light’, it was not that at all. This man brought the country to such misery that the Romanians are not waiting for a repetition of his rule. The clearest example of his arrogance can be seen in Bucharest until this day. In the middle of the city Ceauşescu built a long boulevard in honor of himself. The amazing fountains in the middle of it were only switched on when the President himself drove by. The boulevard started at the ‘modest’ House of the People of 350 000 m² where the President and his wife resided. Although the construction was started in 1984, it is still not finished. The Romanian government does want to complete it, so it can be used as a conference center and government building. Some of the rooms can be rented for marriages. 
The palace is not the only remainder of the past. Traveling through Romania there are still many things that call back the past and people have not yet put it all behind them. The same is of course true for other communist countries. It is only eighteen years ago that the communist regimes fell. Communism has had such an impact on Central and Eastern Europe that its consequences will not easily disappear again. Central and Eastern Europe were not one unit under communism. Communism developed differently in each of the countries although there are many similarities between them. Nonetheless, even before communism was in power in this region, it was seen as a whole because it comprised the so called ‘successor states.’​[2]​ These states emerged after the collapse of the great empires of Austria, Russia, Turkey, and Germany.
	The successor states were all mainly peasant societies and industrialization had not yet come into full swing in these countries. The only exception was Czechoslovakia which was on the way to become an industrialized society, although it was not yet what the West would call a fully industrialized society.​[3]​ Czechoslovakia was also the only state that had a democratic government. The other countries were all dictatorships. “Poland was a ‘directed democracy’; Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia were monarchical dictatorships; and Hungary was a monarchical dictatorship with a regent rather than a king.”​[4]​ King Michael I (1927-1930 and 1940-1947) and his father King Carol II (1930-1940) were governing Romania. The country had democratic institutions but the king was in essence a dictator. The democratic institutions were more and more eroded in the 1930s. To fight the Iron Guards, an extreme right group that was violently anti-communist and anti-Semitic, King Carol made increasing use of terror. Eventually the Iron Guards, with the help of Adolf Hitler, forced Carol to abdicate in 1940 and established a fascist regime that was led by Marshal Antonescu.​[5]​ Michael became king again but he had no real power.
The Second World War changed the world, including Central and Eastern Europe. In many of the successor states fascist regimes came to power, not only in Romania. Some of them, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, were occupied by Germany. The communist parties in these countries gained more respect and more support because they were active in the resistance against Hitler and his Third Reich. (Romanian communists were not very active in the organization of the resistance; they formed a very small group which was severely purged).​[6]​ When the Germans were finally defeated, communist parties came out of the struggle strong and confident of their strength. Moreover, all these countries were ‘liberated’ by the Red Army and although Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had promised during the Yalta Conference in 1945 that there would be free elections in these countries, he later said in a telegram to Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Britain, that “a freely elected government in any of these eastern European countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we could not allow.”​[7]​
	Between 1945 and 1947 communist rule was established in all the countries of Eastern Europe. Only Czechoslovakia managed to survive as a democracy until 1948, when the communists took over the state with a coup that was not resisted by anyone. The Western world had betrayed Czechoslovakia in that terrible year of 1938. Therefore Czechoslovakians did not trust the Western powers after World War II. They put their trust in the Soviet Union (SU) and communism. Sadly enough, these would also betray their trust. Klement Gottwald was the leader of the communist party of Czechoslovakia.  He got a very high position in the government that was formed after the war; he became prime minister.​[8]​ In 1948 the communists demanded 60% of the cabinet posts. The other ministers did of course not agree with that. They resigned on February 20. By doing this they wanted to enforce new elections. But the communists simply took over all the positions of the ministers who had left and Czechoslovakia was no longer a democracy. New elections were eventually held in May, but these were no longer democratic. Street ‘action committees’ compelled people to vote for the communist party. 
After Gottwald’s death in 1953, Antonín Novotný became first secretary of the Czechoslovakian communist party. Novotný also seized the position of president of the Czechoslovakian republic in 1957, when the president, Antonín Zapotocký, died. He united the two “chief offices of party and state in his person.”​[9]​ Novotný did everything Moscow told him to do. He manipulated the party and the whole of the country. Gottwald had already started to purge the country from dissident elements and Novotný followed this example. Eventually however, he could not manage to stay in power because, among other reasons, the Czechoslovakians inhabited a divided country. Czechoslovakia included two different nationalities: the Czechs and the Slovaks. This created friction. Slovaks were not as represented in the government and other influential organisations as the Czechs. They of course protested against that and eventually Novotný had to give in to their claims. Novotný appointed Alexander Dubček, a Slovak, to the Presidium of the Central Committee and allowed other Slovaks to take government positions.​[10]​ Novotný also fell because Czechoslovakian intellectuals enjoyed a lot of respect from the population and these intellectuals were not always very positive about Novotný. 
The Slovak appointed by Novotný to the Presidium became first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party on January 5, 1968. Novotny stayed on as president of the Czechoslovakian republic until March 22. But technically this meant that Dubček was in power now.​[11]​ Dubček wanted a more liberal and democratic form of communism in this SU satellite. It was called “socialism with a human face,” as opposed to “socialism with a Soviet face.” Among other measures he allowed the freedom of the press again and other political parties than the communist party could be present in the political arena. The Czechoslovakians rebelled against the communist regime and supported everything Dubček did. Even when it brought them face to face with the troops of the SU, the Czechoslovakians stood firm behind him. The SU did not approve of “socialism with a human face” and therefore invaded Czechoslovakia on 20 august 1968. Conservative communism was restored and stayed in power till 1989.
In Romania communism established itself in a different way. The communist party did not have that much support there because it was not very nationalistic. People were rather afraid of Russia’s imperialism. In 1918 Romania had acquired Bessarabia and Russia wanted to regain it and of course it also wanted to spread communism. The Romanians were worried about Russia recovering Bessarabia because they were afraid of communism.​[12]​ In 1940 Romania had to give back Bessarabia and also Northern Bukovina to Russia. Moreover, because the Iron Guards had pursued an effective anti-communist policy during their rule, there was not a noteworthy communist party in Romania after the war. Moscow was not very supportive either to Romanian communists. After the Second World War, under occupation of the Red Army, Romanian contempt for communists in general and Russians in particular was only confirmed. 
The Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was thus not in a good position to gain power. Support was minimal and it was very small. But four years after the end of the Second World War the communists had succeeded, through the support of the Soviets and the occupation of Romania by the Red Army, to become the leaders of the country. The government that was formed after the war was gradually taken over by the communists. The communists dissolved other parties in 1947 and their leaders got life sentences. King Michael I had to go into exile that year. The leader of the new communist government was Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a 46-year old railway-employee and member of the communist resistance during World War II.​[13]​ Under his leadership the communists began to reform Romanian society and economy. He was a dictator and used terror and the secret police to implement his will. When he died in 1965 because of cancer, his successor, Nicolae Ceauşescu, continued his example to a terrifying end. The Central Committee elected Ceauşescu, who had been a cobbler before he joined the Communist Party in 1933, to be General Secretary three days after Gheorghui-Dej’s death.​[14]​ Ceauşescu stayed in power till 1989.

In this thesis a comparison will be made between the communist regimes of Romania and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and 1970s. Of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe these two were the most hostile to or inaccessible for communism, albeit for very different reasons. Czechoslovakia had a deeply rooted democratic tradition and the Romanians were very nationalistic and saw Russia as their enemy because of its imperialism. They were both more independent from the Soviet Union than the other Warsaw Pact countries (Czechoslovakia only until 1948) and tried to go their own ways. Both got a new leader in the second half of the 1960s (always an excellent moment for rebellion) and there were leaders who could lead the opposition. Nonetheless, communism established itself in both countries and it remained in power till 1989. In Czechoslovakia, just as in most Central and East European communist regimes, the people resisted, for instance during the Prague Spring in 1968, but in Romania there was no major uprising. Because the circumstances were more or less similar for both regimes, but the outcome was different (Czechoslovakia experienced the Prague Spring, the regime in Romania remained stable) the comparison of the regimes will be made between Czechoslovakia and Romania and not between two of the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
	The period that will be examined will be roughly the 1960s and 1970s because that was the time of the student movements. The whole world seemed to be in uproar.​[15]​ Moreover, it was the best time for changes. Czechoslovakia and Romania got new leaders, it was a period of détente between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU), and so it was relatively ‘safe’ to rebel. It was less necessary for the communist countries to form one front against the US. There were examples to which Romania could look: there were strikes in Poland and Dubček came to power in Czechoslovakia. But although the thesis will mostly concentrate on these decades, we will make references to earlier or later periods, where this is relevant. 
	The making of a comparison is however not without problems. How can something that is so big and diverse as a country be compared with another country that is just as big and diverse? How can a certain aspect be studied without taking other aspects into account that influence each other in real life? These questions touch upon the problem of holism. Cases (in this thesis Romania and Czechoslovakia) are combinations of many different aspects. To make a real comparison these combinations should be taken into account.​[16]​ It would definitely be much easier to look only at the individual aspects but that is not how things develop in everyday life. Aspects can form combinations that together cause something to happen but do not have the same effect for the individual aspects as such. If we look for instance at an imaginary case of rebellion that is caused by a combination of adverse economic conditions and a peasant revolt and would not have happened when only one of the two causes (either a peasant revolt or adverse economic conditions) would have been present, an important part of the explanation would have been missed by looking at the peasant revolt and adverse economic conditions separately. A comparison that only takes the individual aspects into account would thus lack an understanding of the complexity of the case and therefore be no real comparison. 
But that is not all. For example, if a historian wants to compare countries, he can not just compare China and the Netherlands without taking into account that China is much bigger than the Netherlands. Combinations but also aspects can change over time. The economies of sixteenth-century and twentieth-century England cannot be compared without taking the consequences of the Industrial Revolution into account. The Industrial Revolution has changed ways of production and transportation (to name only two things) in such a way that it is impossible to look for example at the exports of the economy of the sixteenth and twentieth century and only conclude that twentieth century England exported much more to other countries than sixteenth-century England. The ways of production and transportation have changed since the sixteenth century and that had an influence on the economy.  
To solve these and other problems several methods have been developed for the comparison of cases. The most sophisticated method is the Boolean method. The Boolean method unites the case-oriented method and the variable-oriented method. The case-oriented method looks at a small number of cases. It offers a thorough and detailed study of different cases without losing track of the peculiar development of such a case in history. This method would for instance compare the causes for the Enlightenment in France and in America without forgetting the special position of France as the mother country of the Enlightenment and the influence of the War of Independence on the American case. Therefore this method does not lose sight of the complexity of a case. It does not break cases up in different variables which no longer say something about the situation.​[17]​ But this also means that it is impossible to generalize with the outcomes of a case-oriented study, because they only say something about the period and the cases that are studied. The results have no value for other cases or other periods of time. For instance: in America the Enlightenment was greatly influenced by the fight for independence. If this would be, for example, a cause for the Enlightenment to happen in America, it is impossible to say that a fight for independence always causes the Enlightenment. In most countries the Enlightenment was not brought about by a war for independence. 
The variable-oriented method however is “more concerned with assessing the correspondence between relationships discernible across many societies or countries, on the one hand, and broad theoretically based images of macro social phenomena, on the other.”​[18]​ This method wants to explain macro social phenomena that are general. These phenomena are complex, so in the generalization, part of the historical conditions of the phenomena are lost. Cases are thus broken up into different variables which do not correspond with the complexity of the case anymore. A variable-oriented would for instance look at the Reformation in all the countries of Europe. Such a study could look for similarities and find certain aspects of causes that all or most of the countries had in common. For example, if most countries had in common that the Reformation was initiated partly because rulers decided it to be more profitable to be free from the Roman Catholic Church; this would be seen as an important cause for the Reformation everywhere. The variable-oriented method would say that in general the countries of Europe experienced the Reformation because their leaders wanted to be free from the control of the Roman Catholic Church. That the way in which or the reasons why the rulers led their countries to the Reformation can be entirely different, just look at Germany and England, does not become clear with the variable-oriented method. Moreover, not all cases fit this general picture, in the Netherlands the Reformation was more initiated by popular movements. (This example and the one about the Enlightenment are only meant to make the working of the methods more understandable, it is not my intention to say something about the causes of the Reformation or the Enlightenment). 
    The Boolean method combines the advantages of both methods while it does not take over their disadvantages. It does not break a case into components, but allows the case to keep its historical complexity. Yet, it makes it still possible to generalize with these data. With the Boolean method the study of a large number of cases, without breaking them into different variables, is possible, while they are still studied as wholes. For example: for the Reformation study this would mean that both the role of leaders and the role of popular movements would be listed as a possible cause. After that, the investigator would look at all the countries of Europe and investigate if these causes were present in these countries. In this way many cases can be studied without losing sight of the historical peculiarities. This thesis however concentrates on only two countries under communist rule: Czechoslovakia and Romania. It is of no use to apply the Boolean method to only two cases, as this method needs a large number of cases. Moreover, Czechoslovakia and Romania are only compared for the period after the Second World War until the fall of the communist regimes in 1989. Therefore there is no need to escape the limitations of historical peculiarities of the cases, they are from the same historical period and have thus more or less the same historical peculiarities. 
In this thesis I will therefore use Mill’s indirect method of difference. This method “is used to establish patterns of invariance.”​[19]​ I’m looking for differences because the outcome in Romania and Czechoslovakia is different. The differences will thus explain why there was a Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, while there was no revolt in Romania. The method works as follows: suppose a historian thinks that low living standards can cause a revolt against a communist regime. Mill’s indirect method of difference says that he first has to look at cases in which a revolt did happen to see if there were low living standards. If it becomes clear that in these cases there were indeed low living standards, then the historian will examine if stable communist regimes experienced high living standards. If that is indeed the case then it is clear that low living standards are a cause of revolts against communist regimes. In this thesis I will only look at two cases. After having identified a possible cause for rebellion I will thus investigate if it is present in Czechoslovakia and Romania. If it is present in Czechoslovakia and not in Romania this means that the absence of this cause will probably be an explanation for the absence of revolt in Romania. At the other hand, the presence of a cause in Romania, while it is absent in Czechoslovakia, can also be an explanation for the absence of revolt in Romania.       
This method is not perfect. It has disadvantages, for instance, if low living standards and freedom of the mass media both independently cause revolts against communist regimes, it is possible that there are cases in which only one of these two causes leads to the revolt, while the other cause is absent. When the investigator looks at instances of freedom of the media, he would possibly see that there is indeed a connection between freedom of the press and revolts. However, he then will look at instances where there is no freedom of the press and conclude that freedom of the press is no cause for a revolt against the communist regime because low living standards alone can already cause a revolt to happen. Parallel investigation of low living standards would lead to the same conclusion, only now freedom of the press would be seen as a cause.​[20]​ This disadvantage will, however, not be of great importance for my thesis because I study only two countries. I’m not trying to find the cause for stability of communist regimes; I’m investigating what were probably the reasons for the stability of the Romanian regime. 
Generalizing will be much more difficult with only two cases. If, for example, a leadership cult kept Ceausescu in power while the absence of a leadership cult cost Novotný his position, I cannot generalize and say that a leadership cult will always lead to maintenance of totalitarian rule, because there can be another case, which I did not study, that shows a leader with a leadership cult who loses his position. However, comparing only two cases has the advantage of allowing a detailed investigation of the cases of Romania and Czechoslovakia, which can give more insight in the way communist regimes maintained their power. Mill’s indirect method of difference forces the investigator to make the decision if a cause is present or not. In this way causes become more clear and more telling, because they cannot endlessly be discussed and described. There is a point where the investigator has to decide if the factor under investigation is or is not a cause of the outcome. Historians usually love to nuance, but Mill’s method does not do that endlessly and in that way it becomes more clear what the important factors are. 
Although this does of course not resemble the complexity of the cases completely, it will not lead to a wrong representation of this complexity because there are only two cases from the same period examined.​[21]​ Romania and Czechoslovakia have a lot in common; it is therefore difficult to see what made the difference. Both countries were a one party state, both had a security police and a strong leader, both regimes eventually stayed in power till 1989. When we want to know why there was no revolt in Romania while there was one in Czechoslovakia, we have to see clearly the differences among these similarities. Mill’s method gives us a better view of the causes. After having indicated some key factors which could have played a role in Romanian and Czechoslovakian society, Mill’s method will be applied. All the factors will be carefully examined for both cases. If a cause is missing in one of the cases, it is likely that this cause has played a role in the different historical development of Romania and Czechoslovakia. These factors have caused the absence of revolt and dissent in Romania.  
I will use a number system to indicate if a cause is absent or present in both cases. A zero (0) will symbolize the absence of a cause in one or both cases, while a one (1) will indicate the presence of the cause in one or both cases. 0 also indicates the absence of the outcome that is investigated and 1 means the presence of the outcome. Because I have only two cases and it is quite possible that a cause is present in both cases but is more present in the one than in the other, I will also indicate if a cause is present for 25%, 50% or 75%. I will thus have five possibilities to show if a cause is present and for how much (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1). I will limit myself to these five possibilities in order not to lose the advantage of a clear picture of the really important causes. More possibilities will only make the estimates arbitrary because it is very difficult to say exactly if a cause is present for 20 or 30%. These numbers are estimates, not calculable facts. They merely serve to highlight the differences and similarities between Romania and Czechoslovakia. 







The outcome is an absolute entity; in this example the outcome is ‘revolt’. This table then tells us that the leader was not trying to prevent a rebellion in Czechoslovakia (0) and that the outcome was a rebellion (1). In Romania the leader did everything to prevent a rebellion (1) and the outcome was ‘no rebellion’ or stability of the communist regime (0). This does not mean of course that it is thus the role of the dictator that is decisive, there are a lot of other causes too and it is possible that although the dictator of Romania did everything to prevent a revolt (1), the outcome would still have been a revolt (1).


























1. COMMUNISTS AND POLITICIANS

1.1 Introduction
Communist regimes, just like Nazi Germany, are often called ‘totalitarian’. This is usually understood as a regime that tries to get total control over everything that happens and every aspect of its citizen’s lives. The Nazi’s coined the term, but it became wider adopted among both academics and the public after Hannah Arendt, a Jewish philosopher, had published The origins of totalitarianism in 1951. She had come to believe that “it was the systemic reliance on terror, institutionalized in the concentration camp, that linked Russia and Germany and made them both totalitarian.”​[22]​ Arendt related totalitarianism also to mass society and modernity. Other characteristics were the personal dictatorship of one leader based on mass support instead of constitutional legitimacy, aggression towards other states and the presence of a mass movement with an ideology. This last characteristic was the most important: 

The totalitarian form of government depends entirely upon the fact that a movement, and not a party, has taken power … so that instead of the tyrant’s brutal determination and the dictator’s demagogic ability to keep himself in power at all costs, we find the totalitarian leader’s single-minded attention directed to the acceleration of the movement itself.​[23]​

According to Arendt, however, only the regimes of Stalin and Hitler were totalitarian. Other dictatorships were not, including the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, if we look at the characteristics she lists, the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe seem to fit the description. Romania and Czechoslovakia both made extensive use of terror to control the population. A lot of people had to work in labor camps. Novotný and Ceauşescu were both dictators who based their support on the masses. They stood at the head of a mass movement with a communist ideology. In this chapter certain political means to control the country (totally) will be discussed: the power of the party, the role played by Novotný and Ceauşescu and the influence of the security police and their terror. The influence of the SU on the governments of Czechoslovakia and Romania will also be investigated. This is important because the SU had great influence on the domestic policies of the party and many measures of the national governments were consequences of Soviet pressure. 

1.2 Power of the party  
Communist countries had a one party government. One party was in charge and had all the power; of course this was the communist party. According to the Romanian Constitution of 1965, article four, this was also the case in Romania. The Grand National Assembly (GNA) was the highest political organ.​[24]​ The GNA met only twice a year and in case of emergencies. The Council of State and commissions of the GNA took care of the daily affairs. Organs with legislative powers were the Central Committee (CC) of the RCP (which made the GNA almost unnecessary), the Council of Ministers, the National Council of the Front of Socialist Unity and Democracy (NCFSUD) and some deputies. The party dominated the GNA almost completely, this because many members of the CC were also member of the GNA. 
The Council of Ministers’ members were presented by the CC and the NCFSUD. Besides the GNA and people recommended by the GNA (like the Prime Minister, his deputies and the Secretaries of State), leaders of some public and administrative organizations and chairpersons of certain mass organizations also belonged to the government.​[25]​ This was a deliberate policy of the party because the organizations that belonged to the government were party organizations. Moreover, many of the chairpersons of these organizations were family of Ceauşescu. The local governments were called the people’s councils and they were subordinated to the regional and national government. The party dominated these councils; the local party’s First Secretary was usually its chairman after 1967. Party and state were thus not clearly divided. 
Ceauşescu took the first steps towards a personal rule after he became General Secretary in 1965. Although the party held its grip on society, Ceauşescu consolidated his grip on the party. New party institutes were created in July 1965 which stressed a collective leadership within the party and no person could hold a double office in both party and state. This made Ceauşescu’s rivals weaker; they had to give up some of their jobs. In 1967 new statutes were made, making an exception for Ceauşescu. At the Ninth Party Congress (the party congress was officially the most powerful party organ, practically however it was not, it only met every four or five years) a Political Executive Committee was installed, this was to be an “intermediary body between the Central Committee and the top party leadership.”​[26]​ The Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee became the new Politburo. This Politburo had only seven members and served as a means to promote Ceauşescu’s supporters to positions of influence. Many older party members (who could make a claim to power) were replaced by younger party members. 

The Czechoslovakian constitution of 1960, just like the Romanian, described the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) as the “leading force in state and society.”​[27]​ It was however not precisely said how. The Czechoslovakian case was special because it was a country that existed actually of two countries: the Czech and the Slovak parts. Both nationalities had their own governmental institutions and could make more or less their own decisions. The National Assembly was the most important legislative organ of Czechoslovakia (thus of the country as a whole). The Constitution of 1960 severely limited the autonomy of the Slovak part of the country. The Slovak governments’ executive part was dissolved and given to the Slovak National Council. This was mostly Novotný’s decision. The National Assembly got the power to undo decisions which were made by the Slovak National Council. The administrative bodies of the Slovak government were also taken over by the Czechoslovakian government; Czechs formed the majority of this government. After 1968 the federative system was reinstalled.​[28]​ 
In the Czechoslovakian government, as in most communist governments, party organs occupied a “key role in the machinery of power, and [were] organized in a self-contained system. The party’s power [was] concentrated in the activities of the party organs, based on a constitutional provision for its leading role in the state.”​[29]​ These party organs were the presidia and secretaries on all levels. Power was delegated from the top, where control over the whole of society rested. This power rested in the hands of the Presidium, the Central Secretariat and the Central Committee (CC). The Presidium was the organ that directed the CC, but the CC in itself did not have much power, it usually only ratified decisions without many questions. The secretaries of the CC and the Presidium took the decisions. This meant that the actual power was concentrated in the hands of a small group of people, usually not more than twenty. Slovakia had its own Presidium, Secretariat and Central Committee but these were subordinated to the central organs of the Czechoslovakian communist party.​[30]​  
The party secretariats and their machinery formed the party’s essential power within society. This party apparatus controlled extra-party and mass organizations. Through the governmental organizations and the party apparatus the Czechoslovakians learned how their country was doing and what was decided on a national, regional and local level. However, only the party apparatus implemented decisions of the Presidium. The party apparatus was hierarchically ordered and answered to the top officials and the General Secretary. It is however remarkable that the apparatus could also act independently from these higher party organs. The secretariats were free to do proposals and groundwork for decisions of the higher organs, to interpret decisions of the government and in choosing the means to implement measures. It was a shadow apparatus because it replaced or just doubled for other governmental institutions; there were secretariats for every aspect of society. The apparatus had 8499 employees in 1967.​[31]​ There was someone in the apparatus for every 280 communists.
	Power of the Party	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	0,75	1	
Romania	1	0	
  Both parties were very powerful and had a close grip on society. In Czechoslovakia complete control was more difficult than in Romania because of the two ethnic groups within the national state which both had their own governmental organizations. Moreover, the party apparatus was more independent from the leadership than that of Romania. The RCP also seems to have just taken over governmental organizations, while the CPC formed a shadow government. Therefore the Romanian party’s grip on society was more complete; the cause is thus present (1) in Romania. It was however also present in Czechoslovakia. Both parties were very powerful, the states were totalitarian; the parties control over society was thoroughly. For Czechoslovakia the cause is thus present for 75% because the party could exert its influence slightly less than Romania. 

1.3 Power of the General Secretary
	Novotný was General Secretary from 1953 till 1968; in 1958 he also became President of Czechoslovakia. Those two posts were the most powerful in the country and Novotný united them in his person. The General Secretary (called First Secretary between 1953 and 1972) was the most important and most powerful person in a communist government. The General Secretary was the head of the Presidium, the Secretariat (the meeting of all six secretaries, the heads of the eight different governmental departments) and the whole government.​[32]​ As General Secretary he had many powers and privileges, because he headed the CC, the Secretariat and the Presidium, he decided which topic was discussed and which decisions were made. He was the commander of the army and the security forces, they delivered their information to him and nobody else, and he decided who beside himself got the information. 
The General Secretary was the centre because he had access to all information; he got the reports from every department and knew therefore everything while other members of the Secretariat only knew about their own department. Novotný was also the head of the Political-Organizational (First) Department (POD) of the Central Committee which gave orders to the party organs on district and regional level; this was one of his most important means to stay in power.​[33]​ Moreover, the General Secretary had the right to appoint officials at the highest level; this meant that he could appoint people who supported him while he could also eliminate his opponents. This led to rivalry among the members of the Presidium and the Secretariat and that only strengthened the position of Novotný. Last but not least, the General Secretary maintained all relations with Moscow. It seems that Novotný pulled all the strings, so how could it be that he was replaced by Dubček in 1968? This was mostly the result of his miscalculations and wrong decisions. He was a conservative who was not able to maintain his position among a triple assault of reform-minded intellectuals, Slovak nationalists and adverse economic conditions. 
It is a misconception to think that deviant thinking was completely impossible in communist regimes; it was only impossible outside the framework of party and state.​[34]​ Within the party or other institutions, like trade unions, youth organizations etcetera, there were different ways of thinking about how to implement Marxist thought. Intellectuals and party members, who wanted reform, did not want a Western liberal democracy; they wanted a reformed communism, or “socialism with a human face.” 
One of Novotný’s greatest mistakes was his refusal to give victims of the Stalinist era their positions within the party back. During the purge of the Stalinist era from 1950-1954 (of which Novotný and most of his supporters were not entirely innocent, as Novotný was already General Secretary in 1953) mistakes had been made. Some people were removed from the party while they were innocent. They were rehabilitated in the early 1960s by two commissions that investigated the crimes committed in the early 1950s but Novotný refused to give them their positions back. Moreover, many of the older conservative supporters of Novotný were found guilty of involvement in the purge and were removed from party organs. Novotný could only save his own position by sacrificing them. Younger party members, who did not have a bond with Novotný, filled their places.​[35]​ Meanwhile, the Czechoslovakian economy did not perform very well, living standards were declining and the goals of the Third Five-Year plan were not reached. Economic experts, who wanted to reform the economy, blamed political decision making for this. Novotný understood clearly that economic reforms would lead to political reforms and that his position would not be saved if he gave the economists a free hand. They never got a free hand but Novotný had to allow their criticisms partially because a solution had to be found.​[36]​ 
Novotný’s attitude towards Slovak nationalists worsened his position even more. During the purge of 1950-1954 Slovak bourgeois nationalists had been treated especially bad; They felt Novotný’s refusal to give them their positions back as an assault on the whole ethnic group. The Slovaks, led by Dubček, felt discriminated against and saw “the reluctance of Novotný and his collaborators (…) as a manifestation of Czech chauvinism and centralism, an insult to the right of self-determination of the Slovak people.”​[37]​ Novotný and his government sharpened control and censure what only had the opposite effect. In the hope he could count on the help of Moscow in a conflict and rebellion, Novotný followed Moscow slavishly. His hope would be disappointed and his docile obedience made him even more condemnable for the opposition, especially his and the SU’s hard line on Israel during the Six Days War of 1967. Eventually, Novotný was not able to maintain his position. 

Ceauşescu also was General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and President of the Romanian nation. The CC of Romania was composed of the highest officials of the party and the state administration and was much bigger than that of Czechoslovakia. Ceauşescu made the Committee grow when he needed the support, with every party congress he added persons he liked.​[38]​ The party congress elected the General Secretary and the Central Committee. The CC in its turn, elected the Political Executive Committee and the Central Committee Secretariat. Finally, the first elected the most powerful organ (together with the Central Committee Secretariat) which had to lead the party and the country on a daily basis: the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee (Politburo). The Politburo had usually around fifteen members, together with the eight members of the Central Committee Secretariat and Ceauşescu, who headed all these organizations, these men governed the country.​[39]​ 
	His colleagues made Ceausescu General Secretary because he did not seem to be a threat. They were never more mistaken. He steadily began to increase his power. Ceauşescu created the office of President himself in 1974. It gave him even more power than he already had.​[40]​ Just like Novotný had done, Ceauşescu now united the two most powerful positions of Romania in his person. Although it became official in 1974, Ceauşescu had been the unofficial President of Romania since 1967, when he became president of the Council of state. Ceauşescu began to release presidential decrees, which soon became the normal way of governing. He did not have to verify his decisions with any other governmental institution, so he could practically do whatever he wanted. In his function as President Ceauşescu also was 

ex-officio President of the Council of State, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and President of the Defense Council. If necessary, he may also preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. He appoints and revokes, allegedly on the recommendation of the government, the Vice-Presidents of the Council of Ministers, the ministers and presidents of other institutions belonging to the same council, as well as leaders of state bodies which do not form part of the official structure of government.​[41]​   

But even this was not all. He also appointed the President of the Supreme Court and the General Prosecutor. Further more he held the positions of Chairman of the Front of Socialist Unity and Democracy and Chairman of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development.​[42]​ Although Ceauşescu did not have the explicit right to appoint officials to party bodies and he could not do that in the early years of his rule, he later had enough influence to put his own followers in positions on, for example, the Executive Committee. Ceauşescu also made sure that his family held many of the important positions. His wife, Elena Ceauşescu, was for instance a member of the Politburo in 1973 and in the 1980s she even was vice-president.    
	Contrary to Novotný, Ceauşescu did not have a stigma of purges clinging to him and he tried to make a modest and tolerant impression when he first came to power. The cult around Dej had given offence so Ceauşescu wanted to make another impression at first.​[43]​ This, however, changed quickly. Ceauşescu also had, at first, the support of the population and of the Western powers; of the latter because he seemed to follow an independent policy towards the SU. However, the longer he ruled, the more Ceauşescu lost touch with the population and reality; his domestic policy became subordinated to his foreign policy. Nationalism and a promise of industrialization were the key issues of Ceauşescu’s political strategy.​[44]​ Ceauşescu wanted not only an economic change of his country but also a moral change. He therefore abolished abortion and divorce. He spoke against laziness, vandalism and corruption. Economically however his policy did eventually not work, living standards deteriorated and support diminished. He therefore relied more on coercion and propagated a personality cult.    
	Save coercion and the personality cult, Ceauşescu relied on a moving of party members and officials to other posts. He placed his rivals in positions where they could not harm him, while he promoted his supporters to the important positions. He also wanted to draw people to the party with a workers background. This meant that many of the officials were not qualified for their jobs because more education was needed to do the job well.​[45]​ The frequent rotation also laid a heavy burden on the party as an organization, because people constantly had to change to other jobs it was difficult for them to do their job well. They first had to learn it again. Moreover, Ceauşescu made sure that the rotation was executed throughout the whole country, so that people could not easily form a group that opposed him. 
	Power of the General Secretary	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	1	1	
Romania	1	0	






1.4 Soviet control and pressure
After World War II the Red Army freed most of the Central and East European countries from the Nazis. Long after 1945 the SU was still present in most of these countries and used the threat of its Red Army to influence the governmental systems that were installed after the war. The RCP would never have come to power if it had not been supported by the SU and the Red Army.​[46]​ So, the RCP had something to be grateful for towards the Soviet Union. Yet, Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe that rejected under both Dej and Ceauşescu Soviet influence and tried to go an independent course. In the first years of Dej’s rule Romania was very dependent on Moscow and there was no unity in the party. To increase unity and to get rid of his rivals, Dej accused some party leaders of linkage with “Stalinist and antiparty elements in the Soviet Union.”​[47]​ 
	Although it was necessary to go an independent course for Dej to keep his power, it was not that important for Ceauşescu. He however made it one of the key components of his political strategy because it made an appeal to the nationalistic feelings of the Romanians. It made them proud of their country and made them support Ceauşescu. The Romanians did not like the SU because of the take-over of Bessarabia and the occupation by the Red Army.   Moreover, it made Romania unique and brought them respect from both East and West. In 1967, for example, Romania, as the only communist country, established diplomatic relations with West-Germany.​[48]​ This brought about a huge protest from East Germany, and Moscow rejected this closer relationship between the countries. The SU and Romania really came to oppose each other about the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Ceauşescu strongly condemned the invasion and refused to participate in it, he had the whole of Romanian society behind him in this matter. Romania was so determined in this that it even mobilised its army to resist an invasion by the SU. 
	The Red Army could have swept away the Romanian army easily; it was absolutely no match for it. Yet the SU did not do that, it protested against Romanian foreign policy but it did not interfere. In fact Romania took great care only to go as far as the SU would allow it to go. The SU had three principles in their policy towards Central and Eastern Europe: “Internationalism’ (the relationships among communist states), ‘security’ (the preservation of the prevailing East-West balance of political power), and ‘legitimacy’ (maintaining the communist parties’ monopoly of power within the individual countries of Eastern Europe.)”​[49]​ Romania only broke the first principle and took care not to break the second or the third. Moreover, despite tough talk and the refusal of 1968, Romania always made sure to fulfil its obligations in treaties and other cooperative alliances like the Warsaw Pact with fellow communist countries. The Soviet Union could accept Romanian attitude because of its tough domestic policy and because Romania did not share a frontier with a Western country (contrary to Czechoslovakia).​[50]​ The fact that Romania could follow such an independent policy was also influenced by stability in the SU itself, the stability of international politics and international opinion. For instance: when Romania criticised and vetoed Nikita Khrushchev’s plans for integration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1962 (Khrushchev’s plan contained a division of labour among the communist countries) that was only possible because Khrushchev had problems in the SU politburo.  
The influence of the SU on the maintenance of Romanian communist rule was also present after the 1940s. Especially after 1968 everybody had seen that the SU was prepared to go to great lengths to preserve a communist Eastern Europe. The possibility that a rebellion would end in the same way as it had ended in Czechoslovakia was very real. The Romanians knew that, although the RCP tried to be independent from the SU, Romania would be invaded if it went too far.​[51]​ The RCP also invoked (although this was more implied than explicitly said) the SU as a means to secure support for policies people did not like. Moreover, the SU had a function as a legitimation of RCP rule too. RCP is rooted in communist ideology, especially Leninism. In the SU it all began, the SU was the first country to embrace communism. Though Romania tried to follow an independent course; it would never completely be out of the SU’s reach.    
	
Novotný did not try at all to be even slightly independent from the SU. He followed where ever the SU led. Czechoslovakia even had the reputation of being the “most docile Soviet satellite.”​[52]​ It supported the SU in its conflict with the Albanian communists. It stood behind the SU again during the Sino-Soviet troubles. It even subscribed to Khrushchev’s COMECON-plan, although it would have had disastrous effects on the Czechoslovakian car manufacturing industry. In 1934 Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev. Soviet policy became more conservative again and de-Stalinization, started by Khrushchev, gained less weight. However, de-Stalinization, with its investigation of the crimes of the 1950-1954 purge, partly triggered the reform movement in Czechoslovakia and could not be stopped anymore. Novotný followed Brezhnev just as faithfully as he had followed Khrushchev, in the hope the SU would back him up when a rebellion would occur.​[53]​ 
	The SU’s influence on Czechoslovakia was enormous. For example, Presidium members knew that eventually not the party decided if they would stay a member, but Moscow. In the early 1950s Moscow even intervened routinely in appointments made to high posts. Therefore Presidium members all tried to get into Moscow’s favour. Good contacts with the SU led to more status in Czechoslovakia. But also later in the 1970s and 1980s candidates were proposed and if Moscow would have any objections, the government rejected the candidate. Moscow’s dislike was enough to get a man, who was already appointed, fired. Army and security forces maintained close contact with the Red Army in the SU. “Its thinking and assessment of social problems [was] influenced by them and it even [acted] directly to realize their interests.”​[54]​ Czechoslovakia did not have an independent foreign policy. It always waited to see what the position of Moscow was in a certain situation or asked Moscow what it thought about something. Czechoslovakian newspapers only printed decisions and important documents about international relations when they had already been to the SU. Economically, Czechoslovakia also asked Moscow what to do and let themselves be guided by specialists from the SU. Sometimes these specialists even lectured the government on decisions that it had made. Culturally, the SU meddled with Czechoslovakian; the embassy in Prague warned the government or the General Secretary himself for certain dissident sounds they heard or read in the press.​[55]​
	Therefore, Dubček did not have much of a chance in 1968; his program shook the fundaments of Soviet communism. Dubček’s Action Programme entailed a change of the party’s leading role in society. The Presidium, the supreme party organ and the General Secretary had been the most powerful institutions. The Action Programme wanted to redistribute power among other party institutions like the Central Committee or government ministries. The power could no longer be unlimited; it had to be restrained by civil freedoms.​[56]​ Censorship had to be abolished and everybody should be able to speak its mind freely. The one party system had to go and other parties should be allowed to compete with the conservative Communist Party. There was however a restriction: these parties had to be based on a common Marxist-Leninist ground. Dubček’s government wanted socialism with a human face. Therefore also a separation of the police and the secret services would be necessary. 
The SU was very suspicious about the reforms, because it feared that the reforms would lead Czechoslovakia much further than the SU could allow it to go. So were the other members of the Warsaw Pact. (When I refer to the members of the Warsaw Pact, I mean of course Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and the SU. Romania, as we have seen, did not want to take part in any measures against Czechoslovakia.)  The ideas about ending the leading role of the party were especially a thorn in the Soviet flesh. The SU told Czechoslovakia to stop the reforms on March 23, one day after Novotný resignation. The SU even stated at this stage of the reforms that it “would not permit Czechoslovakia to fall out of the socialist camp, even at the cost of a Third World War.”​[57]​ Czechoslovakia was this important to the SU because it had Western countries at its borders. It was too dangerous to let Czechoslovakia out of the communist camp, the SU wanted to ensure its safety. The SU tried to make Czechoslovakia stop the reforms in the months after that. Dubček had to account for his reforms several times. The Warsaw Pact or the Kremlin were however not willing to accept even the possibility of his reforms. Troops were stationed at the Czechoslovakian borders; all members of the Warsaw Pact, except Romania, supplied troops.
	Soviet troops were already within Czechoslovakian borders, officially they however were retreating and their presence was not meant to be compelling. The retreat was done very slowly. In July and August the troops began to move at the borders and pressure increased. On July 29 a meeting between the Warsaw Pact members and Czechoslovakia at Cierna, ended with an agreement. This agreement was not made completely public. It is however the question if it could be called an agreement, as the points on which the Warsaw Pact and Czechoslovakia agreed, were very few and if they did agree it was on a very vague basis.​[58]​ The draft version of the new party statutes was made public on August 10. According to these statutes different opinions within the party or society were allowed. Moreover, voting would be secret from now on. The Soviet leadership was not going to allow this; the statutes were a violation of the Cierna agreement. Measures had to be taken because this was going very wrong. Therefore the five members of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia in the night of August 20. 
	Soviet control and pressure	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	1	1	
Romania	0,5	0	
	Both Czechoslovakia and Romania stood under control of the SU and if something was not according to what Moscow wanted they were put under pressure. Yet it is clear that Czechoslovakia was under closer control than Romania, as Romania did really have a more or less independent foreign policy, while Czechoslovakia was not independent. This can be explained by the fact that Czechoslovakia, at the periphery of the communist bloc, was essential for safety of the SU. It is clear that for Czechoslovakia the cause is fully present (1), for Romania the cause is however not absent (0) because it could only go as far as Moscow allowed. I think that the proportion of the presence of the cause in Romania for 50% is reasonable, I would not give it a higher percentage because you see in 1968 that Romania really is prepared to risk a military conflict for their own independence, Romania even mobilized. If that independence does not exist or just a little, you do not go to war for it. Yet, I do not give it a lower percentage, because they took great care not to go beyond Soviet patience. 

1.5 The security services  
The security police (called Securitate) of Romania was a department of the Ministry of the Interior. Ceauşescu made it later in 1967 answer to the party and the government because heads of the Ministry of Interior and the Department for State Security (DSS) were his most powerful rivals. They had access to very important information and could do everything they wanted. They were almost a law unto themselves. Ceauşescu could, for example, only consolidate his position as the leader of Romania by removing Colonel General Alexandru Drăghici as Minister of the Interior in 1965, a position which he had held since 1952.​[59]​ In his early years, however, Ceauşescu did not rely on the power of the DSS as much as Dej. Fear for the Securitate was in these years enough to keep people from rebellious thoughts. In the 1980s things got out of control and the amount of violence used against Romanians by the Securitate increased. 
Ceauşescu was personally involved in the Securitate. For example, he gave personal orders to silence (this meant sometimes to kill) Romanian dissidents in foreign countries. People like Paul Goma, Monica Lovinescu and Emil Georgescu could find a bomb in their mail box, be beaten up in their own houses in Berlin or Paris, or get involved in a serious car ‘accident.’ The Securitate was a very important corner stone of Ceauşescu’s power; it was called the third pillar of his rule by Colonel General Nicolae Militaru, a key player in the revolution of 1989 and the first Minister of Defence after Ceauşescu’s downfall.​[60]​ Although the Securitate was important for the maintenance of Ceauşescu’s rule, it could also be a danger for it. In the late 1970s and the 1980s several conspiracy groups within the security services and the army made plans to overthrow Ceauşescu. These plans were never carried out, although some of them were partly implemented during the revolution of 1989.  
Although Ceauşescu’s early years were more relaxed than the years before, Romania was not exactly an example of a country where human rights were respected. Exact numbers of people who died in prisons or by executions of the Securitate will probably never be known. There were several labor camps across the country. There are no numbers for the period under Dej’s rule. It is only known that in the early years of the 1950s there were probably a total of about 180 000 political prisoners in the labor camps. Between 1947 and 1989 there were probably 282 000 prisoners, 190 000 of whom died in detention.​[61]​ But it is not at all sure if this is a correct number; even in the 1990s mass graves were found with victims who were completely unknown. The bodies had bullet holes so they were most likely executed by the Securitate. The Romanian government, however, wants to forget the past and go on with life. Therefore they do not want to investigate the atrocities of the Securitate.
By the extent of its crimes you would expect the Securitate to be a big organization with many employees and secret informers. That’s however not true. 

The total number of personnel in the DSS in December 1989 was 38 682, of whom 23 370 were in the security troop’s command. The remaining figure of 15 312 covered 6602 in the national directorates and special units, 2426 in the CIE [Department of Foreign Intelligence (DIE) later called CIE], 6059 in the county offices, and 225 in the schools.​[62]​

This was not a large number. Compared to the Stasi (East German Ministry of State Security) which had 95 000 officers for a smaller population, the Securitate was a small group. There were however many unofficial informants in the population. Their number is not exactly known but numbers between 400 000 and 700 000 are estimated. In the county Sibiu, which opened its files, it became clear that there was an informant for every thirty people.

The Czechoslovakian security service resided under the State-Administration (Eight) Department (SAD), which also comprised the sections of Justice, Army and a section that contained Border Patrol, Civil Defense and Paramilitary Organizations.​[63]​ It was one of the most important departments because it was the powerbase of the General Secretary. The security section had several offices; one office was that of the State Security Forces (StB), this was the secret police. The SAD gave all its information directly to General Secretary Novotný. He decided which information the rest of the government would know and which not.​[64]​ He used this information to support his own plans and also to control the rest of the government. Novotný carefully filled dossiers about people who dared to start a discussion, for example, with all possible information he could maybe once use against them.
	The StB executed terrible purges against political dissidents in the early 1950s. Though Czechoslovakian communist first resisted SU advice to initiate a purge after 1949, they eventually started one between 1950 and 1954. Many innocent people lost their party membership, were imprisoned, executed on false charges of treason and given death sentences. The violence of the Czechoslovakian purge exceeded that of the purges in other Central and Eastern European countries, with an exception of course of the SU.​[65]​ The level of violence obtained during this purge was however never repeated again, not even after the Prague Spring. In later years the party distanced itself from these atrocities and even arrested some of the leaders of the purge. According to the Confederation of Political Prisoners of the Czech Republic (CPPCR) numbers of political prisoners are completely known. 248 people were executed by the StB between 1948 and 1989, 247 men and 1 woman. Other victims were the people that tried to pass the border to go to Germany or Austria: 282 people died.​[66]​ The numbers of the CPPCR are roughly matched by the numbers of Amnesty International. Amnesty International says that 287 000 people were sent to prison on political charges or forced into mental institutions (the CPPCR talks about 205 486 people but counts people convicted to labor camps and other institutions in the early 1950s separately). Most of the convicts were in their twenties.​[67]​ 4500 people died in prison.
	The Czechoslovakian security police had more employees than most other departments.​[68]​ The problem with calculating Czechoslovakian agents is that there were two security services. One for Slovakia and one for the Czech part of the country. These did not always work together, for example the head of the State Security service in Slovakia after 1948, Viliam Široký, refused to give information to officials of the corps that was responsible for security. There were presumably between 300 000 and 400 000 secret informants working for the StB.​[69]​ This number seems to be lower than in Romania but we have to keep in mind that Romania is much bigger than Czechoslovakia. 
The impact of the security services has been great in both countries, yet it is a fact that the Securitate has made more victims than the StB. The Securitate’s treatment of the political prisoners was worse than the StB’s treatment: more Romanians died in prison than Czechoslovakians. Moreover, there are no mass graves of unidentified persons in Czechoslovakia. Although people were killed on a great scale in the purge of the early 1950s, they were usually condemned to death by a show trial so their names were known. Therefore the influence of the Securitate on the maintenance of the power of Ceauşescu is bigger, than that of the StB for Novotný. The cause was present (1) in Romania. The SAD had however also a special place in the government because of it being a base of power for Novotný. It was very important, because the SAD was one of two departments that gave Novotný his power (the other and most important one was the Organizational-Political (First) Department which controlled and directed the “internal life of the party and its lower-level units).”​[70]​ The cause is thus present for 75% in Czechoslovakia.































2. REALISTS AND ECONOMISTS

2.1 Introduction
Poor economic conditions can make people rebel against the government. Even when government policy is not the reason for the economic stagnation, people usually still blame the government for it. What was the economic policy of the communist regimes in Romania and Czechoslovakia? What were the goals the government tried to reach? In the first part of this chapter these questions will be answered. More in general will be discussed in the second part the economic condition of both communist countries. What were the economic expectations of Romania and Czechoslovakia? Did the economic policy of the government work? How was their position in the international economic market? Were Romania and Czechoslovakia industrialized countries? Was communism responsible for the condition of the country or was it just a consequence of the circumstances? Finally the prosperity of the populations of Romania and Czechoslovakia will be investigated.   

2.2 Economic policy
Like all communist regimes the Romanian regime used Five Year Plans after 1948 to transform the market economy into a centrally planned economy. They mostly sought heavy manufacturing goals. This sometimes happened at the expense of other economic sectors. After 1953 the development became more balanced and things went better. In the late 1950s the regime wanted to speed up industrialization again. This time the emphasis was on self-reliance which was connected with a more nationalistic and independent policy towards the SU. Ceauşescu built further on this policy of Dej for his own economic policy. Ceauşescu’s economic policy was influenced by his nationalistic views and his insistence on independency from the SU or any other country. Therefore he established relations with many different countries: not only fellow communist countries, but also Western and Third World nations. “Romania has promoted and is constantly promoting a policy of wide international collaboration on all planes, is intensifying foreign trade and economic, technical and scientific cooperation with other states.”​[71]​ 
Economic progress was only seen in terms of the growth of heavy industry. This industry had to be financed by internal resources. The regime postponed consumer goods and services, because these were less important: “(…) the welfare of a people does not consist of what it consumes at a given moment, but of the means of production it owns, its capability to produce the biggest possible quantity of material goods.”​[72]​ The regime’s preference for heavy industry becomes clear from the investments it made in this field of industry. Total investments went up after 1950 from 5663 million lei to 67 529 million in 1969. In the same year the regime invested only 12.3% in ‘nonproductive fields’, it spent even less (3.2%) in the social-cultural field.​[73]​ The regime invested most money in combustibles (coal, coke, oil and metan gas) in 1950. Especially oil was important: this branch got 79.1% of the investments in combustibles. The situation did not change much during the following two decades; Romania became however more developed and more multilateral. In 1971 the combustibles were still important but also machine building, metal finishing and chemicals got a higher percentage of the investment budget.​[74]​  
Romania reached the stage of ‘a unitary socialist economy’ in 1965 and was therefore a socialist republic. “Subsequent decades were to be devoted to the building of a ‘multi-laterally developed socialist society’.”​[75]​ The 1960s and 1970s were very good years for the Romanian economy. Gross industrial output almost trebled in these years and economic growth figures were very high. Heavy industry was still the most important part of the economic policy of the regime. Ceauşescu was not interested in other forms of industry. He introduced large scale multilateral development plans that however proved to be inefficient in later years. Imports of raw materials therefore went up. Ceauşescu considered agriculture to be less important than industry; therefore he neglected this sector to a great extent. The communist regime concentrated on petroleum rigging, petro-chemicals (which depended on petroleum) and drilling equipment. Ceauşescu also insisted on a centralized planning of the economy. Although even Lenin in the 1920s allowed private agriculture and enterprise, Ceauşescu never wanted to compromise on that. The economic policy could not be changed easily, and if it was changed, it had to bring more economic development and not hinder centralized planning.​[76]​ 

Between 1949 and 1953 the Czechoslovakia regime installed a Stalinist economic policy upon Czechoslovakia, just like Romania. The emphasis laid on heavy industry and armaments. Five Year Plans were not lacking. The first Five Year Plan did actually bring economic growth but was also responsible for fluctuations in the years 1953 and 1954. The regime established collectivization after Soviet example. Especially agriculture was the target of this policy. State farms and cooperative farms were erected, but these did not work as they were supposed to. Farmers were very suspicious of collectivization and protested against it because they saw collectivization as a threat to their way of life. In 1953 many farmers were therefore leaving from the collectives. This however affected production seriously, especially that of cereals. In short, the early 1950s saw economic setbacks and declining living standards for the Czechoslovakians. The party sought and found a scapegoat in a group of eleven economists. It found them guilty in August 1954 of “sabotage of socialist reconstruction” and sent them to prison for many years.​[77]​ This of course did not encourage other economists to think for themselves or propose reforms.
Novotný emphasized the importance of the centralized command economy. This however set a ban on local and national initiative. The economy was over-centralized: productivity was low, quality of goods was not much better and many services were not reliable and carried out badly. The regime sought therefore a reform of the system of industrial management to improve the conditions of the Czechoslovakian economy. Individual enterprises got more power to make their own decisions on a micro-economic level and the decision-making process became more de-centralized.​[78]​ It was a halfhearted restoration of the market economy. The government still prescribed quotas, but did no longer decide for the management of the plant how that quota should be attained. In this way the managers of the plants could decide to use the rest of its capacities for the manufacturing of goods for the market. The government also introduced a system of bonuses and privileges for management and workers. However the system caused its own downfall. Because there were set quotas for some products and some could be produced by the plants according to demand, it was hard to see what was exactly produced. Products that would be in demand were produced but it is obvious that articles that are not that much in demand will not be manufactured. They would become rare and thus vital; the list of vital products would never cease to grow in this way.​[79]​
Czechoslovakia’s economic policy was thus very problematic. In 1962 the economy was in crisis, Novotný could no longer deny it. CC member and economics professor Oto Sik, proposed reforms which would lead to a situation that came very close to a market economy. No halfhearted measures this time. He wanted minimal government intervention in the economy and the return of the market. “Factory managers should be given a wide scope for individual initiative, and there should be incentives for both management and work force. Sik even asserted that there was a place for private enterprise in a socialist economy.”​[80]​ Of course Novotný and his fellow conservative communists resisted these proposals for reform. The economy deteriorated in 1967, however, so much that the other party members adopted the proposals without Novotný’s approval. They overruled Novotný; this meant the diminishing of his power and the arrival of the first beginnings of the Prague Spring. Dubček’s Action Programme announced the end of centralized decision-making and a de-leveling of wages. The last would bring about more competition and local initiative the reform communists hoped. They however were not long enough in power to see if their reforms worked.​[81]​     















In 1967 John Michael Montias started the first chapter of his book Economic development in communist Romania with the following sentence: “Official Rumanian propaganda is so strident and repetitious in proclaiming the economic accomplishments of the communist regime that a Westerner accustomed to more subtle means of persuasion may become quite obdurate to its claims. Nonetheless, much of what it blares is true.”​[82]​ The communist regime did however not make an easy start after the war. Though Romania did not have as much war time losses as other East European countries (the damage was not more than 30% of the 1938 national income) it was slow in bringing its industry back on its old pile (only in 1953 it reached the prewar level again.)​[83]​ The Red Army mobilized the economic resources for its own needs and transported many of the industrial plants to the SU. The SU also demanded war reparations (808 million dollars) and established so-called Sovroms, joint Soviet-Romanian companies, through which it gained control over Romania’s natural (oil) recourses. The SU dissolved the Sovroms between 1954 and 1956 and they became Romanian companies after the Romanian government had bought the Soviet shares.    
	Especially the 1960s and 1970s were very good years for the Romanian economy. In the period between 1960 and 1965 Romania’s national income grew very hard, faster than in any other COMECON country. It grew with 10% in 1961 in comparison to 1960, in 1962 with 4.4%, in 1963 9.7%, in 1964 11.6% and in 1965 it grew with 9.6% in comparison to the previous year.​[84]​ The gross industrial output also increased during these years with an average of 13.7%. Romania’s position in the international economy was also good. The export and import quotas were roughly equal, exports often from 1959 onwards a little more than the imports. In 1959 the imports were 3012 million lei (17 lei was 1 dollar) and the exports 3135 million; in 1965 this was 6463 and 6609 million respectively.​[85]​ After 1965 however imports began to rise. Romania exported mostly raw materials and semi-fabricates. Further foodstuffs, machinery and equipment and manufactured consumer goods (in that order). COMECON countries were Romania’s main trading partners (63.5% of the export went to the COMECON countries, 36.5% went to the rest of the world).   
The economic growth came however to an end in the 1980s. The self-reliance policy proved inadequate and the large quantities of raw materials that the Romanian industry had to import were now very unfavorable. Foreign debt rose, yet Ceauşescu kept talking about “centralization of planning and to high rates of investment in heavy industry at the expense of current consumption.”​[86]​ The regime’s specialization in petroleum proved to be disastrous because of the 1980s worldwide oil crisis. The Arabic oil producing countries had raised the price of oil with 70%; this caused a worldwide shortage of oil. This affected Romania’s petroleum industry hugely. Its oil fields depleted after 1976 and Romania had to import more crude oil. In 1980 the harvest was also poor and the state debt rose. Ceauşescu wanted to repay this debt before 1990 and issued some measures that however impoverished the Romanians: bread was rationed and people were not allowed to use refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and other household appliances anymore. Ceauşescu succeeded in repaying the debt shortly before he lost his power and his life.​[87]​ The economy did not recover before the end of the communist regime.    

	Czechoslovakia was the most industrially advanced country in Central and Eastern Europe before World War II. The country was rich in natural resources. There were a flourishing armament and automobile industry. Beside these heavy industries, light industries like textiles, beer brewing, ceramics, glass and shoemaking also developed.​[88]​ This however changed after 1948 when the regime modeled the economy after Soviet example. In the first years of the new economic system it performed fairly well, but because of the emphasis on heavy industry consumer goods were scarce. This again caused inflation because the workers had the money but could not buy the scarce consumer goods. To battle the inflation the government issued a currency reform that had a disastrous effect on the economy. The bad economic condition of Czechoslovakia during these years becomes very clear from the growth of national income and gross industrial output. In this Romania and Czechoslovakia were again opposites; Czechoslovakia had together with East Germany the lowest growth rates of all of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1961 national income grew with 6.5% and in 1962 this was 1.4%. In 1963 national income even shrunk by -2.2%. One year later it grew again but only with 0.9%, in 1967 it was going a little better, national income grew with 3.7%.​[89]​ 








Before looking at the prosperity of the Romanians and Czechoslovakia’s, some abbreviations and economic concepts will be explained. Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross National Income (GNI) is the value of all goods produced in a country plus income earned in foreign countries by country residents, minus the income of foreigners in the country. In previous years GNP has been less used because the world is becoming more international and more people are working in foreign countries. Therefore Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often used nowadays. GDP is the market value of all products and services produced in a country; this can also be production of foreign companies. Contrary to GNP, GDP does not take into account production of foreign companies from which revenues go back to the mother country and does take into account revenues of investments in foreign countries. At last, Net Material Production (NMP.) NMP was the communist variant of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). NMP differs from GDP 

primarily by taking account of ‘non-productive’ activities, such as public services, only in so far as they consume outputs from the productive sector, and by including a deduction for depreciation on fixed assets. GDP is usually more than 20 per cent higher than NMP, but the growth rate of the latter has generally been slightly higher.​[91]​  
 
The 1960s and 1970s were economically good years for Romania. Were the people also doing well or were their circumstances still very bad? The GNP per capita of Romania indicates that Romanians earned an average wage of 27 393 lei per year, which is around 1611.34 dollar in 1982. That is not much. For example, if you look at the Netherlands there the GNP per capita for 1982 was 20 858.30 dollar.​[92]​ The average monthly income of the Romanians in 1980 was six times as high as what it had been in 1950, but it was still only 2238 lei (131.65 dollar) per month.​[93]​ Michael Shafir is more optimistic with a GNP per capita of Romania of 69 632 to 74 851 lei, that is 4096 to 4403 dollar per year in 1982.​[94]​ This is however still not very much. In comparison to the West, the Romanians were poor; their material standard of living remained depressed long after the war but conditions improved steadily after 1955. If we look for example at the national income of Romania we see that it rises fast in the next years: in 1955 the national income had increased with 92% in comparison to 1950, in 1960 this was even 168% and in 1969 it had grown with 461%. 
More people had a job and could earn a living: in 1955 the number of wage earners had increased with 39% compared to 1950, in 1960 this was 53% and in 1969 134%.​[95]​ Purchasing power also increased after the 1950s, but even in the 1960s it was not above prewar level. Before World War II a Romanian had to work an average of 34 minutes for a kilo of white bread, 3 hours and 3 minutes for a kilo of sugar and 5 hours and 38 minutes for one kilo of butter. In 1952, however, he had to work 1 hour and 33 minutes for a kilo of white bread, 5 hours and 50 minutes for the sugar and 20 hours and 22 minutes for the butter. The price of bread came to its prewar level only in 1975; sugar and butter began to lower in 1955.​[96]​ Generally the same trend can be seen in rates of the consumption per capita: in the 1950s consumption dropped, after that it began to increase again. Workers enjoyed a higher standard of living than peasants. They only spent 45.6% of their income on food and beverage while spending more on non-basic items like capital goods, telephone and culture and education. For peasants this was 62.7%.
	
As has already become clear, living standards were not very high in Czechoslovakia. There was a lot of unrest among the population about the economy. Intellectuals and specialists worried about the consequences of the Stalinist system, while farmers resisted collectivization and workers rioted against the system and the currency reform of 1953. This reform hit workers very hard. “Workers, especially in the best-paid categories – miners, steelworkers, and construction workers – lost about half their real wages and their savings were virtually wiped out.”​[97]​ Strikes and demonstrations were everywhere. The regime did not concede to the demands of the rioters but the demonstrations did show them that the socialist system was not very popular. For workers were the most important class in a socialist society and precisely this class protested most. The annual growth of the Net Material Product (NMP) of Czechoslovakia was in 1954 to 1960 1%, in 1961 to 1965 0.3%, in 1965-1970 1.3% and in 1971-1978 0.6%.​[98]​ 
	The shortage of consumer goods was acute. Especially clothing and shoes were hard to find. Furniture, food and bed linen were also not easily available. The shortages hit mainly children and their mothers. 75% of the women answered the question: ‘In your opinion is there a market, surplus, enough, or a shortage of cheaper everyday articles?’ with ‘shortage.’ The shortages affected men only slightly less, 69% spoke of a shortage of cheap articles.​[99]​ Prices were very high, especially of furniture, meat, building materials, tropical fruit cars, footwear, textiles and butter. From 1964 to 1968 prices went up with 12.4%. Czechoslovakians earned a monthly base wage of between 1000 and 2000 crowns (1 dollar was about 7 crowns), that is thus 143 to 286 dollar per month. Most Czechoslovakians thought an income of 2400 to 3600 crowns per month necessary for a family of four to live comfortably. ​[100]​
	The incomes did not increase much over the years. Asked in 1968 if their incomes had gone up in comparison to 1967, 54% of the Czechoslovakians answered that they had stayed the same and for 12% incomes had even decreased. Salary earners and cooperative producers profited most from income increases. Only 23% of employees of private business profited from an increase in income.​[101]​ But even when their incomes did increase, Czechoslovakians’ purchasing power did not. The income of 46% stayed the same as the year before and 41% of the Czechoslovakians saw their income decrease. Farmers earned even less than other groups in society. According to 53% of the population living standards remained the same in 1969, 24% even said they dropped. People therefore were not very optimistic for the future almost nine out of ten people thought that prices would be higher or much higher for the next year.​[102]​ Despite the high prices, alcohol consumption went up; especially the Slovaks began to drink: in 1936 they only consumed 2.8 liters per capita, in 1964 this had already increased to 3.7 liters but in 1973 this was 11.5 liters.​[103]​     





































3. SOCIALISTS AND ARTISTS

3.1 Introduction
Ceauşescu had of course not only a political and economical policy. He also had ideas for what society should look like. He tried to touch upon every aspect of the lives of the Romanians. Ceauşescu even decided how many children Romanians should have. All this meddling into their affairs could have brought the Romanians to protest against the regime. This chapter therefore looks at the social aspects of Ceauşescu’s rule. First, Ceauşescu’s and Novotný’s social policies regarding the health care and educational systems will be discussed. Housing conditions will also be talked about. The cultural decisions the leaders of Romania and Czechoslovakia made and how they were perceived by the cultural elites of both countries will be investigated in part two. Finally, the role of the media in both countries will be discussed. Were they completely controlled by the government and thus only printing propaganda or could they criticize the regime? For the media have an enormous influence on what people think and do.

3.2 Social system
Most communist regimes had excellent health and social welfare systems. Education and medical care were available to almost every member of the population. There was considerable progress in the development of medical care during the communist regime. After 1954 medical care was free of charge for most people. The number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants increased with 327.3% in the period 1938 to 1980.​[104]​ Only 15.1% of all newborn babies’ were born in a hospital in 1938, in 1980 this number increased to 98.5%. Partly because of this, infant mortality decreased with 85% from 1938 to 1980. The care for older people improved and life expectancy grew, most people before 1938 never reached their retirement age, under the communist regime this changed. In 1938 1895 inhabitants had one physician at their disposal; in 1971 there was one for every 655 people.​[105]​ This is of course a great accomplishment for the communist regime.
One of the most controversial measures Ceauşescu took during his rule was the announcement of Decree Nr. 770 in 1966: this decree forbade abortions in an attempt to raise the population growth. The objective of this decree was to increase the Romanian work force. In previous years abortion was easily available to every woman in Romania because it had been legalized in 1957. If a woman wanted an abortion, she could just walk into the local clinic and for the amount of two dollar someone helped her. Doctors interrupted four out of five pregnancies in this way.​[106]​ Ceauşescu gave a reward to women who gave birth to more children. If a woman raised more than ten children, she got the title of Heroine Mother. When the mother had between seven and nine children, the government initiated her into the order of Maternal Glory, and it rewarded five or six children with the Maternity Medal. The first year Ceauşescu policy worked. In 1967 the Romanian birth rate doubled, but after that the rate dropped again. However, because women could no longer get a legal abortion and there were no other birth control means available, women took refuge in illegal abortions which led to a maternal mortality rate three times as high as before 1966.​[107]​ Moreover, child mortality rate rose after the decree had been issued. Many children were malnourished because there was not enough food.
Just like most socialist countries, the Romanian communist party tried to open the educational system for every layer of the population and not only for the people who could afford an education. The emphasis was on technical education, because in a communist country workers are very important. Yet, Ceauşescu thought that the humanities and social sciences had to be taught too, only there had to be a focus on the great deeds of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). The educational system was really good, as is proven by the fact that in 1956 80.1% of the population could read and write (in 1976 this was even 98%), while only 22.7% of the population could read in 1930.​[108]​ In 1950 Romania was still mostly an agricultural society, 74.1% of the population was farmer, but this percentage dropped till 28.9% in 1981. Most farmers became workers in the industry. Only 12% worked in the industry in 1950, in 1981 this was 36.1%. Although not as much as the workers, the number of university graduates also increased: from 5.3% to 8.6%.​[109]​
The Central Committee of the RCP decided during a plenary session in October 1967 to allow corporations and other cooperatives to build their own buildings. Housing conditions improved under Ceauşescu when the state also offered to support apartment construction by private individuals. The government allowed higher rents because this would lead to a better maintenance of the houses. In this time the wages increased so people could afford the extra costs, it was thought. The rent had to be differentiated according to income though.​[110]​ This did not work out as expected. Wages did not rise as much as the rents so people could not afford the newly built houses. Moreover, the demand was much higher than the supply. The houses were not very good. Moreover, though these problems would have been enough, Ceauşescu did not make things easier for the people of Bucharest. For his great palace whole areas of the city had to disappear, families had to leave their houses.

The health care system of Czechoslovakia was also good under the communist government. Of course there had to be difference, so apparatchiks and the leadership had an even better access to medical care than the rest of the population. The State Sanatorium (SANOPS) stood at their disposal and they benefited from care in other sanitariums and spas.​[111]​ The Czechoslovakian social system was modeled after the system of the SU. This meant that workers had a privileged position. Medical care was in most cases free of charges. In that respect the Central and East Europeans were spoiled. But because of the economic difficulties in most of these countries and especially in Czechoslovakia the system did not always work as it was supposed to work.
During the communist era the Czechoslovakian educational system improved. The regime made it completely state-supported; everybody could thus follow an education. Children went to nursery school from age three to six. Then they moved on to elementary school till they reached the age of fifteen. Schooling was in those years compulsory. Subsequently they could go to a general secondary school or a vocational school for three years, which prepared them for higher education. In this three-year period the students already had to choose one of the following directions: social science, mathematics, humanities or languages.​[112]​ After these three years the students could go to a university or other form of higher education. Many of them did: Czechoslovakia had many intellectuals. Czechoslovakia was already more advanced on the way to industrialization than other countries from Eastern Europe; it was no longer an agricultural society in the 1950s like Romania.
The regime’s housing policy reflected its preferential treatment of workers. It did not want to give everybody a similar treatment because this was a bourgeois or capitalist way of doing things. The socialist state of Czechoslovakia rewarded its workers for their important work. National Committees, which kept the registers, assigned houses to people on two conditions: the ‘urgency of need’ (like overcrowding, the number of children, sickness etcetera) and the ‘significance of work’ of the applicant.​[113]​ The regime dissolved cooperative housing associations in 1950; it forced some to merge with other associations into large district housing cooperatives. Private enterprises lost their houses to the state without any compensation and were dissolved. Communism abolished ownership, so you could not really own your house. The state was the only building contractor and administrator. The government built houses according to expected population growth and shortages. These houses became smaller and smaller over the years. In the late 1950s the regime allowed cooperative and enterprise housing again. “There were two main reasons behind the introduction of cooperative schemes: (1) the use of private purchasing power in a direction considered to be socially desirable; and (2) the further incorporation of [an] informal “administrative market” into the construction industry.”​[114]​ These cooperatives soon took over the first place of the state on the housing market; this would stay that way till the end of the communist regime in 1989.









Ceauşescu’s cultural policy changed during his rule. When he came to power in the second half of the 1960s he followed a liberal policy because he wanted “die Schriftsteller und Künstler für seine Politik zu gewinnen und einzusetzen.”​[115]​ Ceauşescu allowed some books to be published that first were refused and he rehabilitated some writers or even whole literary genres like the avant-garde literature. This was not because the party wanted to do something about the abuses of earlier years. People could not talk about that; for instance, the regime did not allow the reader to know that the story or poem had come into being while the author was in prison. Ceauşescu thus immediately set the limits for this liberalization. Writers and artists officially had the freedom to do what they wanted, however their work had to be truthful and it had to be for the people. No art for art’s sake, but functional and understandable; it had to teach the people. Although Ceauşescu did not want to call this form of art Socialist Realism, the artistic style promoted by Moscow and that had to give a real picture of reality and had the aim to teach the people about socialism, its relation to it was very close.​[116]​
Ceauşescu changed in these first years many of the prominent leaders and the structures of cultural and party organizations that had a function in the cultural sphere. This is of course something he also did in politics; it gave him more power over the cultural development of Romania. When writers took the claim to be truthful very seriously and even described some wrongs in the RCP, or for instance like Dimitru Radu Popescu about the Romanian school system of the 1940s, it became soon clear to them that Ceauşescu did not want them to be that truthful. In these years the innovative work came from young writers but the party started a campaign against them. Ceauşescu’s nationalism also had an influence on culture. There came more emphasis on the historical tradition of Romania.​[117]​ Romanian culture was unique and specific Romanian, just like the Romanians themselves. They were rational, high-spirited, nationalistic, independent, tolerant and had a great power to accommodate to the circumstances. This could be found in their cultural heritage too.​[118]​ Romanians were that way because of different geographical, climatic and ethnic reasons.
In 1971 Ceauşescu’s liberal policy came to an end. This end had been prepared from 1967 onwards. On 6 July 1971 Ceauşescu revealed 17 Theses which caused the Mini Cultural Revolution (after China’s Cultural Revolution.)

Ceauşescus ‘Kulturrevolution’ von 1971 bedeutete: Festigung der Hegemonie der Partei im geistig-wissenschaftlichen Bereich und Sicherung ihrer direkten Leitung; totale Ideologisierung der Tätigkeit in den Bereichen und Institutionen der Kultur, Kunst, Wissenschaft und Erziehung; Umkehrung der Rangordnung zwischen dem fachlichverwaltungsmäßigen und dem ideologisch-politischen Kriterium zugunsten des letzteren; teilweise Rückkehr zu den ursprünglichen Formen in der Propaganda- und Kulturarbeit (Wandzeitungen, Agitationsbrigaden usw.)​[119]​

It was no longer possible to voice opinions other than those of the party through novels or articles, or even have an other idea of beauty and art than the party. This Mini Cultural Revolution also brought some personnel changes. The party now tried to prevent the publishing of books, which it allowed first, and prizes for books could no longer be given by a jury. Only the party could grant a prize to a writer. The party emphasized two guiding principles more and more in later years: cultural products had to be in line with Marxist-Leninist principles and otherwise culture had to be an expression of the Romanian nationality.
Not all writers, painters and poets agreed with this view of culture and art. The party tried to ensure itself of the cooperation of the artists, but many of them refused openly. However, Ceauşescu made it soon clear that who did not agree with the new party lines would be no longer a member of the party or the Writers Union. Even these possibilities could not convince all artists of the necessity of Ceauşescu’s 17 theses. Most artists wanted to be able to be critical of reality and did not want all literature to be the same. They voiced their criticism openly. Among them were Titus Popovici, Eugen Jebeleanu, Dimitru Radu Popescu, critic Ovid S. Crohmălniceanu, novelists Fănuş Neagu and Aurel Dragoş Munteanu and the poets Nichita Stănescu and Marin Sorescu. They also protested against the censorship and they did this in very clear language. Fănuş Neagu said once about the censors: “Diesen Idioten, die mir meine Zeit stehlen und mir die Hand, mit der ich schreibe, zermalmen.” ​[120]​

There was a governmental department for ideological matters within the Czechoslovakian government. This department was responsible for the cultural and scholarly intelligentsia, schools, propaganda and mass media.​[121]​ It was a department that was constantly under fire from all other departments. They criticized the Ideological Department more than any other department. This was because of its unwillingness to take severe measures against creative and cultural scholars and institutions that made deviant artistic work. The other party organs or at party meetings often voiced calls for a harsh treatment of the cultural elite. The party leaders thought that art and other cultural expressions were unnecessary and useless. They were something of the bourgeoisie and not of the workers. Museums and shrines for party history and great leaders like Marx, Lenin and Stalin were of course something else.​[122]​ Especially if the cultural work expressed another view than the party line, it could count on fierce opposition from all other departments, even though they had no authority or knowledge to deal with these matters.
During the 1940s and 1950s the CPC tried to remold Czechoslovakia’s artistic traditions into a new, Soviet dictated style: Socialist Realism. It forbade Western literature, and allowed only some classics, like the works of Homer and Shakespeare, and books that showed the negative sides of capitalism, for example those of Charles Dickens. The CPC forbade Western films, excluded modernist painting and sculpture and jazz and rock and roll were not forms of music the Czechoslovakians should enjoy, according to the CPC. If we look for example at jazz, the CPC gave the following reasons to despise this sort of music. Firstly, it saw jazz as a form of American imperialism: “The American music industry (…) produced swing and bebop as part of an imperialist strategy.”​[123]​ Rock and roll and jazz were less than other forms of music. The old composers of classical music and ballets: those were the real musicians. Jazz was decadent. There was a strong connection between jazz and sexual excesses, according to communists.  The music promoted the decadent lifestyle that was so characteristic for the bourgeoisie. It also stood for America.​[124]​ Jazz promoted personal expression and individuality. Individuality is something a human being can do without in a communist society with its emphasis on equality and homogeneity.
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s the strong hold of Socialist Realism over the artistic development of Czechoslovakia began to loosen a little, although it never disappeared completely. Socialist Realism remained an important guideline for all cultural expressions. The loosening up was the work of young intellectuals, they gradually gained for themselves the right to go beyond the boundaries of Socialist Realism.​[125]​ These years were a cultural ‘golden age’ for Czechoslovakia. Many important artists were releasing their best works. Among them were the Slovak writers Laco Novomeský and Ladislav Mňačko, the Czech authors Ludvík Vaculík and Jiří Mucha, the playwrights Václav Havel and Pavel Kohout and film directors Miloš Forman and Jan Kadár. In their books, poets, films and plays the artists experimented with different styles and a variety of subjects. The artists did not shrink from some criticism towards the regime. For instance: Milan Kundera’s novel The Joke, though a fierce attack on Stalinism, could be published in 1967 and even made into a movie by Jaromil Jireš.​[126]​ This criticism brought them often in difficult situations with the regime and had serious consequences: the communists denied their books publication, expulsed them from the party and took many other measures against them. The regime of Gustáv Husák, that came to power after the Prague Spring, tightened the screws and the ‘golden age’ was over.









3.4 Mass media and censorship
In the first years of Ceauşescu’s rule, things did not seem to be very bad for the media. Journalists and editors enjoyed proudly some professional autonomy. The media explicitly stated in those years that the RCP did not dictate to them what they published. Although the media could not write everything they wanted, there was, especially compared to later years, some professional freedom. The media could voice different opinions (as long as they of course had a common Marxist ground). That however changed in the late 1960s.​[127]​ Ceauşescu began to say that the media’s only duty was to further party ideology, there could be no other opinions than that of the party. However, the real confinement of the media’s freedom came in 1971. A journalist could no longer follow an education at a normal university but had to go to the Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy.​[128]​ Moreover, in this year Ceauşescu created a National Council on Romanian Radio and Television that resided under CC secretary Dumitru Popescu. There came one union for all workers in the media and a Council on Socialist Culture and Education, which resided directly under the CC, controlled the whole of the media.
The Press Law of 1974 finished the process Ceauşescu started in the late 1960s. This law stated that the media would be promoters of the party line and the journalist was no longer an independent investigator. Journalists could still criticize if things were not done well, but it was forbidden to criticize party policies and party leaders. A journalist, who would be doing his job according to Western standards, could easily cross these and several other vague limits. This was, however, not all: in the same year the party “reduced the number, size, frequency and circulation of Romanian newspapers and journals.”​[129]​ The RCP wanted to save paper and thus forests, it said. 160 journalists lost their jobs in the first weeks after the initiation of this measure. The others became more careful and self-censorship became more common because otherwise they would lose their jobs too. The regime established a new Committee for Press and Printing in 1975. This committee was only subordinated to the CC and the Council of ministers. This committee had several goals and powers: it wanted to further party policy in the media and it got the powers to do so. It also could prevent publication of unwanted articles, it controlled all printing presses, it could hire or fire every journalist it wanted and controlled what the domestic and international public would read.​[130]​
These measures made the Romanian press just another propaganda machine for Ceauşescu. The press played an important role in the personality cult around Ceauşescu and his wife. Moreover, if a journalist had no problem with lying or at least not telling certain things then it was very attractive to become a journalist. Access to libraries, free traveling and excellent career opportunities: being a journalist had surely advantages. The Romanians of course did not believe all the things that the press said. They knew about the party’s control over the media. People therefore got the real information somewhere else. Especially American radio stations like Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Voice of America (VOA) were very popular. Eastern Europeans were tuning in on the programs almost every day. For Dubček and his liberal reformers VOA and RFE were not unknown.​[131]​ Especially programs on the VOA were popular, because they did not go with the heavy propaganda against the SU and the boosting of America and capitalism, contrary to programs on RFE.

The Ideological Department of the Czechoslovakian government was responsible for the mass media. Within the CC secretariat however there was also a secretary for the press. The General Secretary and the press secretary decided every day together which news could be published in the mass media. The press office then released this information to the papers and television. The media were not allowed to publish anything else than the information from the press office. The press was however neither free to comment on this information as it liked, the regime told the editors exactly what had to be said about it.​[132]​ But this was not all: the party even decided where or when the media could release certain information. For example, news that was not so good for the party’s reputation but that could not be kept out of the media was put in the last news broadcasts at night only or in a very small place on an obscure page of a paper. This censorship also reached literary and scientific articles, books and other publications. Publishers and the media had to further party goals, so they were responsible for their publications. This led to a kind of self-censorship by the press, publishers and writers. However, it was not completely impossible to voice criticism in Czechoslovakia, as long you still accepted Marxism as the leading ideology.
The Central Publication Board was a party organ that resided under the prime minister. It gave directives (it listed for example persons or topics which could not be named in any publication) and monitored the observing of the rules. The media could protest when they did not agree with the ban of a certain topic and this was frequently done. Editors could go to the party apparatchik that was responsible for the topic and complain to him, if he did not agree with them, they could go to his superior. “In rare cases, the conflict [went] as far as the CC secretary, who [made] a final decision.”​[133]​ During the Prague Spring there was especially opposition from the media against censorship and control of the party over the news and information. Dubček allowed freedom of the press again. This was not total freedom, there were still some restraints. For example, the press could criticize other socialist countries only to a certain level, but in comparison to what it had been before, the press gained a lot of freedom.​[134]​ The media protested against the Warsaw Pact troops and spoke out for the reforms even after the political leadership had already given up the battle. However, the press came again under close state control during the government of Husák.
The population knew the press of Novotný did not tell everything to them and that it did not always tell the truth. Asked during the Prague Spring, if they felt that now the press was more than before speaking in their names, 85% of the people said yes. For the period of Novotný only 1% of the population answered that the media then had spoken mostly for them.​[135]​ 73% of the people thought that the media did their job well in the days of the Prague Spring. Only among leading secretaries of the CPC this percentage was not more than 16%. Yet even 62% of the ‘normal’ CPC members agreed that the media did not discuss topics they should not discuss.​[136]​ In the first days of July 1968, the National assembly passed a law that abolished censorship; 86% of the population supported this law. These numbers make it clear that most Czechoslovakians did not agree with censorship of the media, they supported freedom of the press.
	Control of the party over the press.	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	0.75	1	
Romania	1	0	
It is clear that both countries experienced censorship of the media. It was however more thorough and complete in Romania than in Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia there had been more opportunity to express deviant views (as long as they were based on Marx) than in Romania. Especially during the Prague Spring the press of Czechoslovakia was almost free in what they wanted to write. However, it is important not to think too much of Czechoslovakia in this comparison because although it was more free it was certainly not completely free. For Romania it is allowed to say that the party controlled the media almost completely (1), the Committee for Press and Printing controlled presses, publications and the journalists themselves. In Czechoslovakia the press was not completely under state control, it is however clear that the Central Publication Board was also very powerful and if an article contained ideas that were not grounded in Marxism, it could not be published. The reason is thus present for 75%.

4. CONFORMISTS AND DISSIDENTS

4.1 Introduction
Leaders are less likely to come to power and stay in it without at least some support from the people. Of course a leader can use excessive violence to maintain order or to come to power, but it is unlikely that he will be powerful enough at all stages of his rule to impose this kind of oppression. He will therefore need at some point the support of the people. In the case of Romania and Czechoslovakia both leaders came to power legally, within the context of normal communist government processes. They were both elected by the communist parties of their countries. Not all Romanians and Czechoslovakians were communists. There were dissidents who protested against the communist system. There have to be leaders in these dissident movements who lead the protests. Usually there are different groups in the population who each protest in their own ways: intellectuals, workers, ethnic minorities and churches. In this question I like to investigate how much support there was for Novotný, Dubček and Ceauşescu and which groups in society contributed the most to a rebellious atmosphere. 

4.2 Support 
Protest against Novotný was shown openly by students and workers in the years before 1968. He did not have much support from the people whereas Dubček was overwhelmingly popular. Dubčeks’ Action Programme was supported by three quarters of the population. The people wanted him to make Czechoslovakia a socialist democracy.​[137]​ Many groups in society stood behind him and believed in his ‘socialism with a human face’: workers, students, intellectuals, old and young, men and women. This became clear in a research by Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz about public opinion in Czechoslovakia from 1968 till 1969. “But this tendency was most evident among men, older individuals, farmers in large villages, the better educated and members of the Party and the People’s Councils.”​[138]​ There were however two groups in which there was also strong resentment against Dubček. Among youth the number of negative responses was three times larger than in other groups. This group gave also considerably less support to Dubček in comparison with the other groups. This is remarkable because students were the group that protested most against the communist regime before Dubček came to power. The second group that was not completely supportive towards Dubček was the clergy.
The support found its expression in the Two Thousand Words Manifest that was signed by several writers and students on June 27. Scientists, journalists, workers and farmers, all united behind the new government. The Manifest wanted people to be politically responsible for themselves. The communist regime should allow people to make their own decisions and to participate in the politics of their country. Although the Manifest wanted socialism with a human face and all the reforms that went with it, they also wanted Czechoslovakia to remain a communist state. The writers mentioned that there was a possibility of an invasion by a foreign power (with which the SU was meant) but on the other hand they emphasized the good relation between Czechoslovakia and its communist allies. The Manifest said that when the impossible would happen, Czechoslovakia had to fight.​[139]​ When the impossible did happen eventually, Czechoslovakia however did not fight, but the people answered the invasion with a non-violent resistance that certainly deserves respect.  
  	After the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact, except Romania, attacked Czechoslovakia, the last doubters were convinced and took the side of Dubček. Radio Prague called upon the people to resist the troops in a non-violent way.  The Soviets would not get any help, food, fuel or money from the Czechoslovakians. The Czechoslovakians answered directly and enthusiastically: within a few days after Radio Prague had asked the population to remove all road signs (it would be harder for the Soviets to find their way around Czechoslovakia in that way) only the signs for Moscow were still hanging on the side of the roads. All the other signs were removed. Especially the young and students were responsible for this. But students did more: they printed leaflets in which they called upon the people to resist, they demonstrated, blocked the ways for tanks and had heated discussions with the crews of the tanks.​[140]​ Other people just did not sell food to the Soviets but left the more active resistance to the young.  

In Romania the communist regime was resisted by the population from the beginning. In the 1940s and the early years of the 1950s the resistance was however concentrated in the countryside. In the cities there was in general support for first Georghe Gheorghui-Dej and later Ceauşescu. In the countryside the resistance took the form of a partisan fight against the communist regime.​[141]​ The partisans were mostly farmers and Fascists who did not want a communist regime. In 1956 this situation changed. In the cities students and Romanian Hungarians became rebellious, because the regime did not support the Hungarians, which in that year rebelled against their communist leaders and the SU. At the contrary, it gave all its support to the SU. First it seemed that Romania would support Hungary and Yugoslavia, which followed an independent course under Josip Broz Tito. However, in 1958 it became clear that Romania had made a silent deal with the SU: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romanian soil in exchange for support.​[142]​ The leaders of the Hungarian rebellion were even brought to Romania and imprisoned there. This operation was led by Ceauşescu. The Hungarians were treated harshly: Imre Nagy, the leader of the opposition, did not even get a blanket against the cold and “während seines Rumänienaufenthaltes verlor Nagy ca. 30 Kilogramm Gewicht.”​[143]​ 
In the first years of his rule Ceauşescu made himself very popular. His strongly independent stance against Russia, his nationalistic measures and the improved economic conditions, all worked together to ensure the consent of the Romanians. The communist regime was so sure of itself that it even freed most of the political prisoners in the early 1960s. In a decree from June 1963 the regime stated that it wanted to release two thousand five hundred political prisoners. These were not just words: in the whole year of 1963 there were 2892 prisoners set free and the regime continued doing this in 1964. 

At this time it was by no means unusual, even for a foreign visitor, to see a group of prisoners, worn out and bedraggled, standing in a group at a railway station. They would stare wide-eyed at the unaccustomed life around them, looking utterly lost, and then they would shuffle off in their various directions.​[144]​
	
This began to change after 1968. Although the Romanians did not want Ceauşescu’s regime anymore, they got the feeling that resistance was impossible. However, Ceauşescu was not strong enough yet in those years to impose his rule completely. Writers were therefore able to express a wide range of opinions in the press. It also became clear that the population was not very enthusiastic about the communist system through the multi-candidate elections to the Grand National Assembly.​[145]​ Through these elections, which were held for the first time in 1975, Ceauşescu wanted to show that Romania was a truly democratic, socialist state. The elections were however merely a fraud. All candidates had been selected by the Socialist Unity Front (SUF), the national organisation that covered all social organisations and organized the elections; therefore every candidate was already approved of by the communist regime. Someone who did not have the correct views and ideas was simply not nominated. 
Most Romanians however refused to choose: they just turned in the ballot. The ballot was a little odd. Suppose that there were two candidates, of whom one had to be chosen. The ballot was arranged in such a way that both candidates (both selected by the party, so there was no real choice) were already marked. You had to go in to a voting booth to choose just one of them. Most people did not do that and turned in the ballot with a favourable vote for both candidates. This shows how apathy towards the communist system had taken hold of most Romanians. Although almost the whole country obediently went to the ballot box, in fact most people did thus not vote. On the ballot there was also a possibility to vote against all regime candidates, usually printed very small on the ballot. Yet these votes increased: in the elections of 1969 these had been 0.23%, but in 1975 it became 1.2%. This is of course not a big part of the population but it was almost five times as much as in 1969. And the numbers kept rising: in 1985 already 2.27% of the electorate voted against all party candidates.​[146]​     
	Support for old regime	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	0	1	
Romania	1	0	
	Support for Novotný was almost non-existing, while Ceauşescu was supported by the people. Although this support may have been more the consequences of the work of the secret police, the Securitate, than of Ceauşescu’s ideas and leadership, it is a fact that at least in his early years of rule he was popular. If we put these results into a table, we see that where there was no support (0) for the communist regime in Czechoslovakia there did occur a rebellion: the Prague Spring (1.) In Romania there was support for Ceauşescu (1) and there did not occur a Bucharest Spring (0.)

4.3 Dissidents 	
Different groups in a population can protest in various ways against a regime. Often intellectuals are prominent in protests against a dictator or regime. In Romania however intellectuals did not much to oppose the communist regime. There were several reasons for that. In Romania there was a big gap between the people and the intellectuals. The intellectuals thought they were high above normal workers on which they looked down. Moreover, Marxist intellectuals were very scarce in Romania. While in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia the regimes had to face different paths of thought along communist lines, 

the mass of Romania’s creative intelligentsia, on the other hand, found itself in precisely the opposite position, for on the immediate instatement of the new regime, many philosophers, artists and writers could be (and were) blackmailed into collaboration by threats to ‘reveal’ their [fascist] past.​[147]​

Another explanation is often sought in the traditions of the Ottoman Empire that were deeply rooted in Romania. Corruption and bribery were normal political customs. Dissimulation was woven into everyday life. Writers did not mind to pay lip service to the regime, although they might think something entirely different personally. Or they were bribed with special positions and lucrative jobs. A group of Polish writers summarized the situation as follows: “The communist government in the RPR [People’s Republic of Romania] fed their writers better, the communists in Poland allowed their writers to bark freely.”​[148]​ Romanian intellectuals thought it completely normal to praise Ceauşescu in public so that they could go on publishing their own work. A very important reason for conformism under intellectuals was also the nationalist policy of Ceauşescu. Dissent was channelled into protests against Russia or Romania’s other old-time enemy, Hungary. It was out of question to discuss the policies or legitimacy of the regime itself. 
There were however a few brave intellectuals who did protest against Ceauşescu’s rule. For example, a group of young writers was formed in the early 1960s who called themselves the Oneirists, which is derived from the Greek oneiros, which means dream. The important and best-known dissident of Romania in the 1970s, Paul Goma, was closely associated with this group. Although it was not a political group, their view of art had political consequences. They made art for art’s sake and refused to let their freedom of expression be limited.​[149]​ This had of course political consequences and the group could not prevent to be seen as dissidents. Prominent members as Dumitru Ţepeneag, Leonid Dimov and Virgil Tănase protested vividly against the mini-cultural revolution of 1971. When Ţepeneag started a literary journal in France, his citizenship was taken from him in 1975. He also was expelled from the Writers Union, a social organisation for writers. The only one who protested against Ţepeneag’s removal openly was Paul Goma. 
	Goma had already been a dissident at age sixteen. He wanted to join the partisans but was arrested by the regime. He was detained again in 1956 because he read aloud a novel in which the hero wanted to organize a student movement that would match the one in Hungary. After his release in 1962, Goma began to publish novels that were not approved of by the regime.​[150]​ A description of the cruelties that happened in the camps was not something they appreciated. Although it was allowed to tackle this kind of topics, you had to do it in such a way that it seemed to be minor errors, conducted by lower officials. You had to emphasize that the future would be better and that the system in itself was good. Goma refused to do that and the regime refused to publish his books. They had to be printed in the West. Goma also wrote a letter in support of the Czechoslovak Charter ’77, a manifest that accused the communist regime of violating human rights. This charter eventually developed into a movement. Goma started his own petition in which he “simply demanded the implementation of the Romanian Constitution’s provisions concerning basic human rights.”​[151]​ His appeal gained 200 signatures, but these were mostly from workers and ‘common’ people. Many signers of the petition were exiled. Only two other intellectuals dared to put their names under the appeal and they were punished for it. Goma was arrested in April 1977 and exiled. He still lives in France as a stateless political refugee.  
	Romanian intellectuals did not do much to start a rebellion or revolution. The workers did more: in August 1977 35000 miners began a strike in the Jiul Valley. They wanted better living conditions; they lived in very poor houses and did not have enough good food. They also wanted a new pension law. These were of course no real demonstrations for freedom and democracy, when Ceauşescu arrived on the third day of the strike the workers however cried: ‘Down with proletarian bourgeoisie.’ Workers protested again with strikes in 1978, 1981 and 1983. The regime however crushed the strikes harshly. An attempt to set up a Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers (SLOMR) in February 1979 failed too.​[152]​ After the whole movement was crushed within three months, it never came back again. People tried to reorganize it but it was always put down within a few days. So, although there were dissidents among the workers, there were not many of them. There were only four major strikes in more than thirty years. 
Protest by churches ended in the same way. Churches and other religious institutes had a difficult time in the 1940s and 1950s. The regime promoted atheism and tried to get all churches, no matter if they were Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant or Muslim and Jewish religious organisations, under close state control. Especially the Roman Catholic Church in Romania (the Uniate Church) was prosecuted. One thousand four hundred priests were sent to prison and all except one died there.​[153]​ The Law of Cults from 1948 stated that all decisions and appointment of leaders and ministers had to be approved by the state. The state could also revoke church activity when they saw fit. Schools, which were led by the clergy, had to close and religious education was no longer possible. The state also expropriated all churches without any compensation. 
Although this would seem to be enough reason to rebel, most churches did not. There was a great deal of conformism, especially in the Orthodox Church, which was the largest of the country. Moreover, the religious leaders were not free from lip service in exchange for favours either; they tried to save the members of the church through concessions. There were however also ministers imprisoned, like the Lutheran minister Richard Wurmbrand, who refused to be silent and even in the prisons still tried to preach the gospel.​[154]​ When in 1978 a group of Protestants formed the Romanian Christian Committee for the Defence of Freedom and Religious Conscience (ALRC) and demanded an end to the control of the state and freedom of worship, they were arrested and exiled. In 1989, a Protestant pastor played a very important part in triggering the Revolution. He had preached against the regime and when the regime tried to arrest him, the people came to his defence and rioted against the communists.​[155]​      
	Minorities, Germans, Serbs, Ukrainians but especially Hungarians, did not have an easy life in Romania during the communist regime either. In theory (and in the Constitution for example) it was made clear that minorities had to have their share in government. In real life however, it did not work that way. The regime made sure that the minorities had no real influence on politics and policy. The Councils of Workers that were established separately for each minority did not have any influence. They were placed under close state control and could not really make decisions. Another example of how the regime treated the minorities is that it was not allowed to educate children in the native tongue. In 1952 the Hungarian Autonomous Region was created, but it never got its own government and its existence served as an excuse for the government not to give other Hungarian (cultural) initiatives a chance in other parts of the country. Ceauşescu took even this little bit of autonomy from the Hungarians in 1968. In that year a territorial reorganization took place which erased the Hungarian Autonomous Region. Hungarians and other minorities were not allowed to emigrate or pay visits to family in their native country.​[156]​
Of course, Hungarians and other members of minority groups protested against such measures. One of them was Károly Király, the Vice-President of the Hungarian Workers council. He wrote letters to the government and demanded real influence on the decisions that were made in his council and in politics. Years later, in 1972, when Király was a candidate for the Romanian Communist Party’s Executive Committee he resigned in protest against the way the regime treated Hungarians. He sent letters to Romanian officials which reached the West in 1978.​[157]​ There they became public and now Romania heard the real reasons for his withdrawal. Moreover, in Romania religion and ethnicity are closely connected. For instance, members of the Uniate Church were mostly Hungarian or German and the churches and the clergy played a big role in the fight for autonomy. During Ceauşescu’s rule a lot of tension remained between Romanians and the minorities. It is therefore not surprising that the Revolution in 1989 started in the Banat, a region where many groups lived together: Romanians, Hungarians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Germans, and others.​[158]​

In Czechoslovakia the situation was different but a lot of elements were the same. Czechoslovakia was for example also a country of minorities. The minorities question was one of the two major problems that would eventually cause Novotný’s downfall. After World War I Czechs and Slovaks were put together in one country, even though they were two different nationalities. This did not work without some skirmishes. The majority of the Czechoslovakian population was Czech. They also held more government positions. This was of course something against which the Slovaks protested. To silence the protest, Novotný appointed a Slovak, Alexander Dubček, to the Presidium of the Central Committee. He also gave other Slovaks positions in the government.​[159]​ A decision he would come to regret. The work of intellectuals and their popularity was the second problem that would eventually bring Novotný down. This was completely different from the situation in Romania. 
Students and intellectuals did not have an easy life in communist Czechoslovakia. In 1948 they were purged on a large scale. 

Hundred of students were not allowed to continue their studies and many of them were forced to work as miners, construction workers, or in other manual jobs. Quite a few disappeared in prisons and concentration camps or in the Jachymov uranium mines as political slaves.​[160]​ 

Among students criticism remained. In 1956, when many Hungarian students were killed or sent to Siberia by the SU, Czechoslovakian students asked for an investigation. Of course, the question was never answered. In the 1960s the students demonstrated for freedom and democracy. However, students were not as politically active as you would think. The protests usually started for other reasons but gradually evolved into a demonstration for freedom and democracy. 
On October 31, 1967 there was for example a demonstration against bad housing conditions in Prague. The university campus suffered constant power failures and students just wanted the lights to work for once, but while they were demonstrating their demands suddenly changed and they began to call for freedom and democracy. Although it was not the intention of the police to treat them harshly, the situation got out of hand.​[161]​ The students wanted to go home and pushed the policemen aside, the police however wanted to keep the street open and pushed them back. This could not end well: eventually the police used violence against the students. It turned out that violence was not the answer: on November 8 a big demonstration was organised by the students and the atmosphere deteriorated.​[162]​  In March students from every university in the country voted for a break with the Party’s student organisation, the Czechoslovakian Youth Association. They wanted to break free from party control.​[163]​ 
Other groups in society also protested. Older intellectuals were the most prominent group that criticized the regime. Although students are of course young intellectuals and thus part of the group of intellectuals as a whole, they formed a smaller group within this larger entity. The provocative acts like sit-ins and demonstrations were done by students. The other intellectuals fought with their pen, they tried to reach the regime with other ideas. Like socialism with a human face. By doing that they touched upon the essential convictions of socialism with a Soviet face. Members of the Writers Union were central in these attacks on the old communist order. It were these intellectuals who brought the Prague Spring about, they introduced the reforms that would eventually have to lead to socialism with a human face and make Czechoslovakia a socialist democracy.​[164]​ Sadly enough their attempts were cut off by the SU.  
Workers were not that enthusiastic about the communist regime too. A clear indication of that is the fact that how the party tried to raise number of workers within the party membership, it did not succeed. There was a steady decline in workers attending party conferences; they thought participation to be a “waste of time.”​[165]​ But there was also more active resistance: many signers of the Two Thousand Words Manifest were for example workers. This is characteristic for Czechoslovakian society; there was not a big gap between intellectuals and workers as existed in Romania. Workers and intellectuals worked together in their drive for reform. Workers therefore did not only participate in the reform movement by holding strikes, but they were involved in the other forms of protest too.
Just as in Romania the churches also had a difficult time in communist Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia all church activities were watched and controlled by the state. There was in government a commissioner for church affairs and he could order anything and the churches had to do what was ordered to them by the party.​[166]​ To refer to social questions or say a negative thing about socialism in a sermon was enough to get a priest or minister into jail, especially in the Stalinist period. However, there was a lot of conformism too. There was for example a party controlled Catholic organization of priests named Pacem in Terris, which actively promoted party politics. 
Protestant churches were also closely watched but the communists were more afraid of the Catholics because of the fact that they would eventually rather listen to the pope than to the Czechoslovakian government. Catholics and members of the Uniate church, which was outlawed in 1950, were heavily prosecuted. It is therefore not surprising that in 1968 underground members of the last were the first to riot and demand the recognition of their church. Dubček granted the Uniate church its demand and it kept its rights till the end of the communist era. For that it had to pay a price, it came under the same close control as the other churches. Czechoslovakian Christians, though antireligious harassments did occur regularly and finding a job was very hard, were treated better than Romanian ones. 
	In the night of August 20, 1968 five members of the Warsaw Pact (except Romania, which did not want to take part in the operation and supported Czechoslovakia) invaded Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakians only protested more. After the radio called upon them to resist the troops in a non-violent way, all groups in society answered the call. The young however, sometimes forgot the non-violence part of the call in the first days of the invasion. In an attempt to protect the building of Radio Prague they built barricades in front of it. Even tanks were not safe for them; they set three Russian tanks on fire, and two munitions’ lorries were blown up.​[167]​ After these initial incidents the young followed the non-violence resistance that was approved of by the Dubček government. Although it seems unlikely to win a war with non-violent resistance, it brought the Czechoslovakians worldwide support. Moreover, the troops could not be tempted to use violence against a population that was only resisting in a peaceful way. It gave the Soviets a bad image for the rest of the world, the Soviet soldiers now felt the injustice of their acts more than when there would have been combat. Because there was no reason to use violence, the soldiers began to create them. They smashed windows of Russian corporations and said the damage was done by the Czechoslovakians. In this way they tried to justify the acts for themselves.
	After the Soviets had assured their control over Czechoslovakia the demonstrations continued. When the Soviets reversed all the reforms, the country became even more rebellious. Students organised big demonstrations on October 28. They wanted the Warsaw Pact troops to get out of Czechoslovakia and give it back its freedom. After some initial hesitations the police began to beat participants on October 29. They silenced the students, but not for long.  On November 6 riots broke out again, because this was the day that pro-Soviet inhabitants in Czechoslovakia celebrated the Bolshevik Revolution. Of course, that was like a stab in the heart for most Czechoslovakians. As time went by, Dubček had to take back most of the reforms and do more and more what the Soviets wanted. The people however did not like this. In a resolution published in November the government said that the reforms had been “rightist forces.”​[168]​ The resolution was of course coming from Moscow. In protest students held a school sit-in that lasted for seventy-six hours. Unfortunately that did not have the effect they had hoped for, the Czechoslovakian government and the communist party returned to socialism with a Soviet face.
	The SU had won the battle. Although students even set themselves on fire and died as a consequence of that, the Prague Spring was over. Jan Palach, the first one to try this remarkable method, set himself aflame on January 16, 1969 in Wenceslas Square in Prague. He protested against the Soviet invasion and the end of the reforms. His example was the church reformer Jan Hus. Hus was put to death at the stake in the fifteenth century. The Czechoslovakians admired Palachs’ action, Dubček himself did.​[169]​ Palach died on January 19, his funeral attracted hundreds of thousands of people who paid tribute to him. Demonstrations were held because of his death and other people followed his example. One of them was Jan Zájic. He set himself aflame on February 25. Seven more people would follow. 
Although it seemed that any hope for reforms had been blown away, the Czechoslovakians kept trying to reform the government. After the invasion small opposition groups (mainly disenchanted socialists and communists) remained active but they were arrested quickly. During the early years of the 1970s resistance was therefore merely individual. Until 1977: in that year a group of people from all layers of society protested against the arrest of the rock band Plastic People of the Universe in a charter that was initially signed by 240 people but later eventually collected more than 1200 signatures. The charter also demanded “to heed the provisions in the covenant [the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which grew out of the 1975 Helsinki Conference] for the guarantee of free expression, non-discriminatory education policies, religious freedom, individual privacy, and the right to travel freely across the country’s borders.”​[170]​ Charter ’77 became a movement that protested against many different measures of the communist regime all the way to the end of communism in 1989. However, to be part of this movement was not easy: many who placed their signature on the document were sent to prison for many years, or forced to emigrate. 















politically loaded and there was more cooperation with intellectuals. In Romania their protests were mostly about working conditions. In both countries there was thus a certain rebelliousness among workers (1) but to a different degree. Because of the cooperation between the intellectuals and the workers in Czechoslovakia it was more effective there. Therefore the independence of workers is present for 50% in Czechoslovkia and 25% in Romania. Minorities in both countries were treated differently than the natives (Romania) or the majority (Czechoslovakia.) In Czechoslovakia there was more room for these protests and they also had more effect than in Romania, because of the nationalistic sentiment that is so characteristic for Romania and because there were many different ethnic minorities that did not form one group. Therefore it was possible for Dubček to become part of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The cause was thus present in Czechoslovakia (1) and also in Romania but there not as strong as in Czechoslovakia, therefore the cause is present for 75%. Both Czechoslovakian and Romanian Christians experienced prosecution because of their stand against socialism. Although many were arrested and sent to prison, they still practised their faith and preached against the communist regime. However this was a minority, most churchgoers adjusted to the situation or even supported the socialist policies. 


5. IDEOLOGISTS AND DREAMERS

5.1 Introduction
In this chapter the influence of the leadership cult around Ceauşescu will be investigated. Was this a phenomenon that existed exclusively in Romania or did it also have its counterpart in Czechoslovakia? A leadership cult could be an important means to stay in power because the leader binds the people to his person. People can less easily connect to a system, a system can go wrong or get out of hand, or to a leaders’ policy that can have bad effects. The ideological similarities and differences between the two countries are discussed, because if people really believe in something, they are prepared to follow even when mistakes are made. Ideology can also bind people to a country or a person. Last but not least, an inquiry will be made into the number of Romanians and Czechoslovakians who were communist. Was the majority of the country communist or was it just a small group of people? If the majority is communist it is logical that there is no rebellion because the government would be supported by a great part of the population.

5.2 Leadership cult
Leadership cults have existed in many different forms and countries through the ages. From the ancient Roman Empire till the communist regimes of the twentieth century, leaders were worshiped and deified. This kind of rule seems to have been very attractive to communist regimes: China, Albania, Korea, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Romania all experienced leadership cults.​[171]​ Ceauşescu was not exactly someone with much charisma. He was not a great speaker, he usually read from a page in a monotone voice. Although he had been a communist from the first hour, he was not the one that led the people into a revolution, therefore he would have to “accede to their wishes and moderate his goals, or use coercion and abandon his attempt at genuine leadership.”​[172]​ The cult around his personality arose only in the late 1960s. In the 1970s the cult grew more and more extreme. The picture that was painted of Ceauşescu in the media did not resemble the reality. Through this extensive flattery Ceauşescu lost touch with the people and reality, he thought he was perfect and did not have any weaknesses. 
	Pictures and statues of Ceauşescu were everywhere, in public spaces but also in private offices, although usually not in homes. His speeches and everything he said was collected and remembered. Ceauşescu was infallible. Successes were attributed to him; failures were ascribed to lower officials who had not carried out his directions correctly. Ceauşescu was an example for every Romanian. He had been a peasant but had become the leader of whole of Romania, his life was like a fairy tale, a rags to riches story. He had come this far by working hard and using his head. He was extremely intelligent (according to the media) and therefore was the right person to lead the country; he was “the genius of the Carpathians.”​[173]​ He was further good-humored, dedicated to communist ideology and self-disciplined. In short, he was perfect. The Romanian should learn from him that if they followed the RCP it would all end well eventually for everyone.
Contrary to other communist leaders, except Tito, Ceauşescu lived like a king. Other communist leaders did live in luxury too, but usually tried to hide this from the public. Not Ceauşescu, he lived in the palaces of the former Romanian kings and when he drove by traffic stopped. This was celebrated in the media frequently. Pictures of all the beautiful things he and his wife had were shown often in papers. Part of his image is contradictory here. The image of the hardworking revolutionary does not seem to correspond to his luxurious life. Ceauşescu’s wife had a cult of her own, although it never reached the importance of that of Ceauşescu. This was quite extraordinary and unique among communist regimes.​[174]​ Their children and other relatives also played an important role in politics. This was however not unique in the context of Romanian political process. Families have always played an important role in Romanian politics. For example, the Liberal Party was completely controlled in the 1920s by the Brătianu family. Although circumstances had changed, Ceauşescu clearly rooted his rule in the ancient traditions of his country.
	The leadership cult provided legitimacy to Ceauşescu’s rule. He could not rationally legitimate his rule, because his policies were not always popular in Romania. Therefore he legitimated his rule in his own personality. He alone had the qualities to lead the country. Ceauşescu were given many different characteristics and features (if he really had them or not did not matter), so he would attract all groups in society. The king was always very dear to the peasants. Therefore his royal way of life attracted them. The icons that were made of him also were appealing for the Orthodox Christians in Romanian society. They had worshiped saints and their icons and words for ages.​[175]​ Moreover, the Orthodox Church had always supported the king who was the head of the church. On the other hand Ceauşescu’s image as an intelligent and hardworking revolutionary attracted other segments of the population: party members of course, but also workers and intellectuals. In this way Ceauşescu himself embodied authority more and more, while the party lost authority. 
	
Novotný did not have a leadership cult. He was not a very charismatic man, just like Ceauşescu. He was shrewd and manipulative, but he also was narrow-minded, especially towards the Slovak minority in the country. This of course cost him their support. Novotný certainly did not appeal to every group in society like Ceauşescu.​[176]​ He had been a part of communist party apparatus (although not in a very powerful position) during the purges of the early 1950s. After he had become head of the party Secretariat, he had played a major role in the continuation of political trials and in later years he did not want to denounce what happened in that period. This was something the Czechoslovakians could not easily forget.​[177]​ There had been a leadership cult around Stalin in the 1940s and early 1950s, but this cult was always connected to the purges.  The CPC did not understand in the late 1950s that the appreciation of Stalin had changed. Not long before Khrushchev announced de-Stalinization, a big memorial for Stalin had been erected in Prague.​[178]​ 
The CPC only began to commit itself to de-Stalinization when the end of Khrushchevs’ rule was already nearing. Ironically, Moscows’ point of view changed again under Leonid Brezhnev. In the 1960s and 1970s when the show trials and persecutions of these years were examined, resentment against this sort of leadership grew. Because time had also been the time of the persecutions, the personality cult around Stalin had left the Czechoslovakians suspicious and with a bad taste.​[179]​ On the other hand Novotný relied on something else to maintain his power. A personality cult was usually sought by leaders who wanted to be independent from the SU. To be independent from the SU they needed the support of their population. If they did not want to be independent from the SU they did not need the support of the population because they knew that the Red Army would always protect their regime. Novotný followed the SU in everything and therefore relied on the strength of the SU. It proved not to be enough. Novotný thus had a disadvantage: he could not use his own person to bind the Czechoslovakians to the communist regime. The missing leadership cult was an important weakness of his power.
	In short, a leadership cult reinforces the hold of a leader on a country and its population. Ceauşescu and his wife both were able to develop a cult around them, Novotný was not. Although both men were not very charismatic personalities, Novotný’s past and the past of his country proved to be a major obstacle. There was a personality cult in Romania (1) but there 
	Power of the personality cult 	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	0	1	
Romania	1	0	
never came a rebellion against Ceauşescu in Romania (0). In Czechoslovakia however there 
was no cult around Novotný (0) and there a rebellion did occur (1).

5.3 Ideology and communist rule
Ceauşescu’s ideology was based of course on the theories of Karl Marx, as the founder of communism. In his most influential book, which he wrote together with Friedrich Engels in 1949, The communist manifesto, Marx predicted a revolutionary upheaval by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and capitalism. 

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman – in a word, oppressor and oppressed – stood in constant opposition to each other, carried on an uninterrupted – now hidden, now open – fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.​[180]​
  
After the proletariat would have overthrown capitalism, a classless, oppression free, communist society would emerge. Communism was not a possibility but the inevitable last stage in human history. Because Marx and Engels wanted a worldwide communist society, there would be no states anymore after the revolution, no politics, and no hierarchy. Everyone would live together and share the means of production.
	Ceauşescu’s ideology was also influenced by Lenin. His brochure What is to be done?, published in 1902, would change communism profoundly. In this brochure he described his ideas about a disciplined vanguard party, which should lead the proletariat into a revolutionary, armed revolt against the bourgeoisie and capitalism. The party should also educate the workers about Marxism because workers often followed shortsighted goals, while the party could keep the great goal of a communist society in sight. Without the party, workers could not fulfill their role in history.​[181]​ Revolutionary propaganda played a big role in this. Stalin, eventually, gave up the idea of a worldwide revolution. He developed, together with others, the idea of socialism in one country. Of course it would still be wonderful if there would occur a worldwide revolution but this was no longer an urgent need for the survival of the state. Stalin’s vision contained patriotic elements which we also can find in Ceauşescu’s ideology.​[182]​ His economic policy contained Five Year Plans and an emphasis on heavy industry. Stalinism was further characterized by the extensive use of propaganda to establish a personality cult and the reliance on the secret police to maintain power.​[183]​ 
Part of Ceauşescu’s ideology was of course nationalism. He had used anti-Russian feelings among the Romanians ever since he had come to power, to consolidate his own position. The theme of foreigners trying to undermine Romania was often used. Foreign traitors were the ones that instigated protests; they did not know what was good for Romania. True Romanians would not protest against the regime. This was of course only a way of denying that there was real protest against the regime in Romania and it made it more difficult for the people to rebel, because nobody wants to be a traitor.​[184]​ The Romanians were very nationalistic so they did not want to give the impression that they did things that could harm the fatherland. This nationalism joined the anti-Russian feeling that was very prominent among the population. Ethnic minorities however took a different place. Ceauşescu did not recognize them as separate groups with separate needs, he thought these groups had been living in Romania for so long that they were part of the Romanian nation; they were Romanians and did not need a special treatment. 
	In a way Ceauşescu’s nationalism contradicted Marxism. Western leaders were afraid of communism especially because it did not have nationalistic boundaries; it appealed to workers in every nation and country. It wanted to conquer the world, not just one country. Ceauşescu was less interested in the world than in the fate of Romania. 

The foreign policy of our Party and Government proceeds from the objective reality that in the contemporary world there are states with different social systems, from the necessity of developing relations among them, of exchanging material and spiritual values, of cooperating for the solving of pressing international issues, for defending peace and the security of the peoples. It is in this spirit that Romania is carrying on an intense activity on the line of expanding relations with all countries, on all continents, regardless of their social system.​[185]​

The ideology of the CPC was also greatly influenced by Stalinism. Although there is missing one of the two characteristics of Stalinism, the personality cult around the leader, there was still for a long time a sort of personality cult around Stalin. Even when in the SU de-Stalinization had already begun to take off.​[186]​ In the second half of the 1960s this disappeared and a new way of thinking was coming to surface that, however, was rooted in the political traditions of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had a democratic tradition so “democratic and populist elements (however emasculated in practice)” still influenced the thinking of most people.​[187]​ The new thought that inspired Dubček and the Prague Spring was a mixture of a purified Marxism and special Czechoslovakian ways of thinking. The West has also known purified Marxism; there it was called neo-Marxism. It meant that people returned to the thoughts of the young Marx, as he had written them down in his Economic and philosophical manuscripts.​[188]​ 
	The special Czechoslovakian ways of thinking contained elements of progressivism, populism and liberalism. Czechoslovakian socialist ideology was thus influenced by Western socialist thinking. Throughout its history Czechoslovakia also had often seen itself as a sort of Messiah who would show the way. This element was present in the Prague Spring too. Czechoslovakia would lead the other socialist countries to the reforms that were necessary.​[189]​ This special blend of Marxism and Czechoslovakian thought became known as socialism with a human face. The word ‘human’ in socialism with a human face is a keyword to understand where this form of thinking deviated from orthodox Marxism. Orthodox Marxism taught that everything was decided by economy, culture was also an economic product. In Czechoslovakia in the 1960s however scholars and intellectuals started to investigate human influence on culture and politics. For example, Milan Machovec did research at the humanist foundations of democracy and the history of Czechoslovakian politics before the communists came to power. He especially looked at T. G. Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia from 1918 till 1935.​[190]​  
	Many others followed in comparable studies and analyses. Philosophers, like Karel Kosík and Ivan Sviták, developed creative forms of Marxism and by doing so often took very different points of view according to human influence on the dialectic processes of history. Political scientist, like Miroslav Kusý, Michal Lakatoš and Július Strinka, together with economists began to ask questions about the existing political order. Their most important point was that criticism of the party and its policies had to be allowed, some even went so far that they wanted to allow other parties or multiple candidate elections that were not already decided upon by the authorities. This is clearly a democratic way of thinking. Many artists, writers, poets and other intellectuals, including Václav Havel who would eventually become president of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic from 1989 till 2003, joined the protest. Socialism with a human face was a unique form of socialism which could only have developed in Czechoslovakia.​[191]​




	Contribution of ideology to communist rule. 	Outcome	
Czechoslovakia	0	1	
Romania	1	0	
thinking and ruling. Ideology had made therefore an important contribution in both countries to the maintenance of, or a revolution against communist rule. 

5.4 Ideological power of the party
The RCP started with only 1000 members in 1944 but the party began to grow quickly after that. In 1945 it had already 256 863 members. In general it kept growing right until the revolution in 1989. There were, however, also a few setbacks. For instance in 1948 the party reached for the first time a membership of one million. This happened because the RCP merged with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the socialist party where its roots laid. The RCP had distanced itself from the SDP in 1921. After that the membership dropped until 1964, the RCP then had 1 377 847 members again. Numbers kept rising and in 1970 the membership reached 2 089 085.​[192]​ In 1987, not long before the end of Ceauşescu’s rule, 3 709 735 people were members of the RCP. This is of course a substantial part of the population. In fact, the RCP had more members than any other communist party in Eastern Europe. Even the communist party of the SU never reached more than about 7% of the population. In Romania 14% of the population was a member of the RCP in 1982.​[193]​  
	These members came from all layers of society. However, as can be expected of a communist party, most members belonged to one particular social class: the workers. After 1960 even more than half of the party members were working class. One third of the members were peasants and about 10% were intellectuals or functionaries.​[194]​ During the years workers membership kept on rising (also because this was a deliberate policy of Ceauşescu) but not very strongly. In 1983 workers formed 55.7% of the party. Peasant membership diminished significantly. In 1983 only 15.7%, thus half the number of 1960, of the members had a peasant background. The number of intellectuals rose to a percentage of 20.6 in 1983. Although it was Ceauşescu’s policy to get more young men and women into the party, the figures remained more or less stable during his rule. In 1962 41% of the members were older than 40 years, 59% was thus younger.​[195]​ In 1985 the percentage of members older than 40 had even risen to 50%.​[196]​
	Romanians joined the RCP for many different reasons. Of course there were people who, especially in the first years of communist rule, really believed in communism and the things it promised. The party had an ambivalent image in those years however. As a communist party it had strong bonds with the SU and this was not always received well by the nationalistic Romanians. Later however, when under Ceauşescu the party became independent from the SU, this image changed. It was thought then that a Romanian who loved his country would also support the party. Opportunists who only saw the RCP as a means to get power were also found in Romania. They wanted to have a career or joined the RCP because it was a great opportunity for upward social mobility.​[197]​ Many of them were former supporters of the fascist regime of Ion Antonescu. They wanted to atone for their past and save their own skins. Later their membership would give a lot of controversies among the party leaders. 

Although not as big as the RCP the CPC was not the smallest communist party of Eastern Europe. Throughout its history, membership had fluctuated wildly. In 1929 the CPC had only 30 000 members. After the coup of 1948 this changed and the CPC became with 2.5 million members the biggest party of Eastern Europe.​[198]​ Its membership diminished again after 1965 and in 1970 it reached its lowest point when 8.6% of the population was a member of the party, while that of most other Eastern European communist parties grew. Especially after the Prague Spring membership fell because many of the reformers (25% of the party membership) were expelled from the party after 1968. The CPC was surpassed by the RCP in 1970 and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1975.​[199]​ In the 1980s membership numbers began to grow again but not as much as in Romania. In 1982 its membership was 10.3% of the total population. This meant that around 1.5 million people were communists in Czechoslovakia.​[200]​ Most of these people were between 30 and 50 years old.​[201]​ 
Just like in Romania, the CPC also claimed to be a workers party so it was important for the party leadership not to lose contact with this social class. There were many attempts to enhance the proportion of workers in the party. In this way the leadership also wanted to hold a grip on the workers and ensure their support for the party. Despite these efforts however, workers membership diminished. In 1947 47% of the party members were workers, in 1966 this was only 32.9% and in 1970 their numbers had declined to 26.1%.​[202]​ Many party members were passive; they did not really do something but were just member of the party. This was the case for most intellectuals because they saw membership as a kind of professional obligation. Their numbers in the party were, in comparison with Romania, very high. Especially the party leadership had in most cases a professional background: already from 1945 till 1948 61.1% of the leaders in the highest ranks (CPC Presidium, Secretariat, or governmental positions of Ministerial rank) were intellectuals. There were no top leaders with an agricultural of managerial background, the other leaders (38.9%) had been or came from the social class of industrial workers.​[203]​
Czechoslovakians too joined the party because they believed in its ideas and ideology. This was mostly the older generation, who already were a member before 1948. Others however were forced to become a member or joined out of fear for political persecutions. As a member of the CPC you enjoyed a certain protection that other citizens did not have. Moreover, becoming a communist was an excellent opportunity to start a career. Doors that were firmly closed for everyone else suddenly flung open and the bureaucracy was even helpful. Party members and party apparatchiks had a higher standard of living than the rest of the population.​[204]​ Most party apparatchiks’ wages were around the 2000-3500 crowns. “In 1967 only 4.3 percent of Czechoslovak working people had an income level of 2500-3000 crowns, and only 0.4 percent reached a level of 3500 crowns. Apparatchiks thus belonged to the highest income category and its leading functionaries to the very highest.”​[205]​ These functionaries earned wages from 7000 to even 15000 crowns a month.
These data about the communist parties of Romania and Czechoslovakia confirm a picture we have already seen in earlier parts of this thesis. There are many similarities but also some telling differences. Both communist parties were very big and the greatest part of the membership came from the working class. In Czechoslovakia however more intellectuals participated in the party and this led to more discussions about Marxist principles. Moreover, we see in both countries that people joined the party for ideological, practical (to avoid persecution) or opportunistic motives. For the population we could say the party played a role as an employer and protector. Although the party also had an ideological role to play, this was not the most important role of the party in the lives of ordinary citizens. And although 14 and 10% of the population is of course a force you have to take into account, the majority of Romanians and Czechoslovakians were obviously not communist. Therefore I think that the ideological power of the party was not that great and did not play a very big role in maintenance of communist role.





























In the foregoing pages I have tried to discuss factors that could have caused or helped cause a revolution against the communist regimes in Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1960s and 1970s. In the table I have listed all the causes and their absence or presence in Czechoslovakia and Romania. As we have already seen, however, a cause is most of the time not just present or absent, usually it is for example present in Romania but not as prominent as in Czechoslovakia. It is clear that causes that are present in one country but not in the other are likely to be the ones that have made a difference, because the outcome is different in both countries. Czechoslovakia experienced a revolution in 1968 but Romania did not. Unfortunately it is not always this clear because causes are not always wholly present or not. Therefore I will discuss the causes according to the following categories: first, the causes that seemed to have been present or absent in both countries, where there was no difference. Second, the causes that had a less than 50% difference (thus for example the security services only differed for 25%.) Last, the causes which were different from each other with more than 50% will be discussed, this are the causes that are likely to have really mattered. 
Cause	Czechoslovakia	Romania
Power of the party	0,75	1
Power of the General Secretary	1	1
Soviet control and pressure	1	0,5











Independence of churches 	0	0
Power of the personality cult	0	1
Contribution of ideology to communist rule	0	1


















The first category of causes contains factors that are actually not causes for the stability of communist rule in Romania, because they also existed in Czechoslovakia were there was no maintenance of communist rule. The factors are similarities rather than differences between the two countries. The first similarity between the two countries is the position of the General Secretary. General Secretaries in general and Novotný and Ceauşescu in particular were very powerful. They had powers to appoint their supporters and fire their enemies. They were head of the government and the party and could control their colleagues because they had the monopoly on information. Their powers to stop or prevent a revolution from happening were equal. Ceauşescu used his powers better and therefore could ensure the stability of his regime. The Prague Spring did thus not happen because Novotný had not the means to stop the reformers but he did not use his powers good enough to prevent the revolution. 
The economic policies were in essence very similar, namely Stalinist. These damaged the economic systems of both Czechoslovakia and Romania severely. Czechoslovakia was willing to compromise and tried to save the economy by halfheartedly allowing market forces into their system again. This only made things worse. Ceauşescu, on the other hand, was not prepared to make changes or to do concessions that would hinder centralization or industrialization. Romania’s economy was also severely damaged in the long run; this became very clear during the 1980s. Because both policies were very bad for the economy they will not have made a difference, as despite the bad policy Romanians did not rebel against Ceauşescu. The social systems of both countries were very similar too. The health and education systems were very good although they did not always work like they were supposed to. A fact is however that the social systems became better under communist rule. 
Churches were not very active in the resistance against the communist regime even though religion was seen as opium for the people and the control of the state was very close. The church leaders usually supported the regime and were not independent from it, sometimes they tried to save their members in this way but they supported the regime also because conformism was profitable. Christians that refused to conform to communist rules were heavily prosecuted: they were exiled, sent to prison, tortured or even killed for their faith. The majority however did not protest against the regime in both Romania and Czechoslovakia, their contribution thus can not have been decisive. The ideological power of the party did not make a great difference either. People who became a member of the party for ideological reasons were usually older than other members and had already been a member before the party came to power. Opportunistic or practical reasons for joining the party were more common. Moreover, 80 to 90% of the population was not a member. Therefore we can say that the party did not bind the population ideologically to the regime in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Yet the Czechoslovakians did rebel while the Romanians did not. This factor thus did not cause the revolt.      

Cause	Czechoslovakia	Romania
Power of the General Secretary	1	1
Bad economical policy	1	1
Social system	1	1
Independence of churches 	0	0
Ideological power of the party	0	0


The second category is the most difficult category because these factors differ from each other only slightly. Therefore it is more difficult to see if these causes were decisive. They probably were not the most important differences because usually the situation in Romania was not completely the opposite of the situation in Czechoslovakia, so it is only possible to speak of the degree to which a cause did play a role in the stability of communist rule. First, the power of the party: in Romania as well as in Czechoslovakia the party ruled the country and decided everything. There was nothing the party did not control. The party was able to lay its will on millions of people for more than forty years. In Czechoslovakia however control was more difficult because of the two ‘states’ within the borders: Czech and Slovakian institutions. The party apparatus was more independent from Novotný than the Romanian party officials from Ceauşescu. The RCP also had taken over the government while the CPC formed a shadow government (which probably is a consequence of the two nation states within its borders) that makes control more difficult. The CPC could thus be less totalitarian than the RCP and therefore revolt would be easier although certainly not without danger. The cause was present for 75% in Czechoslovakia and for 100% in Romania.
The security police can also play a big role in suppression of protests and revolution. The security police did play this role in both Czechoslovakia and Romania. In Romania the Securitate played a greater part to protect Ceauşescu’s power; this is already proved by the greater number of victims the Securitate made. The cause was thus present. Novotný’s power rested on two pillars: the State-Administration (Eight) Department (SAD), (which contained all means of a state to maintain power: justice, the army and a section that contained Border Patrol, Civil Defense and Paramilitary Organizations) and the StB, the security police. The police was one section of the SAD, although a very important one, but the SAD was more important. For Czechoslovakia the cause was thus present for 75%. The party extended its control to the press too. In both countries there was extensive censorship over the media. In Romania it was however more difficult to express deviant views in the media than in Czechoslovakia where it was possible as long as they had a common Marxist-Leninist ground. In Romania the cause was thus present for 100%, in Czechoslovakia this was 75%. 
Workers and minorities were both groups that protested against the communist regimes. Workers were not the main group of protesters: intellectuals were especially in Czechoslovakia much more rebellious and workers protested more against working conditions than against the communist regime. Yet, they did their part in both countries. In Czechoslovakia their protests had more effect because there was more cooperation with other groups in society, mainly intellectuals. Minority protests were very prominent in both countries. In Czechoslovakia however they were more prominent: they formed one part of the triple alliance that eventually caused Novotný’s fall. The Slovakians formed also one big group, a great part of the nation. In Romania there were several ethnic minorities that did not act as one group. Living standards were low in both countries; scarce consumer products and high prices were the result of the Stalinist system. In Czechoslovakia however the economy was also partly in crisis as a result of the currency reform of 1953. The purchasing power of the Czechoslovakians did not increase, while that of the Romanians did.  

Cause	Czechoslovakia	Romania
Power of the party	0,75	1
Security services as a means to maintain power	0,75	1





Finally, the third category: the causes that really made a difference and can be seen as the reasons why Romanian did not experience a rebellion like Czechoslovakia. All Central and East European countries stood under close control from the SU. Central and Eastern Europe was its ‘backyard’; it did not want any rebellions there. Czechoslovakia however followed the SU’s every wish but Romania was more independent, especially in its foreign policy. Therefore Soviet pressure was total in Czechoslovakia (1) but not in Romania (0.5) although Ceauşescu did take care not to go too far. An important factor for the SU’s close control over Czechoslovakia was also the countries position at the borders of the West. Culturally both countries experienced a period of liberalization at the same time: the 1960s. This however did not mean that artists and writers could do and say what they wanted. In Czechoslovakia the artists and writers got more freedom than in Romania because many critical works were released in the period preliminary to the Prague Spring. Romanian writers could not even say that a certain poem was written in prison. In Romania the cause was thus fully present (1) and in Czechoslovakia it was also present but there people could be critical and reform minded.
 The intellectuals were very important in Czechoslovakia. They were the ones that wanted reform and protested against the regime. Romania lacked this. Intellectuals did not protest much, only a few brave individuals like Paul Goma protested. Therefore the absence of activity of the intellectuals was an important reason the stability of the Romanian communist regime. The great activity of intellectuals in Czechoslovakia and the fact that the Prague Spring happened there are telling. In the 1960s and 1970s the economic condition of Romania and Czechoslovakia was completely different. Romania’s economy did very well in those years. It is remarkable that these countries, which in principle had the same economic system with the same bad consequences (shortage of consumer goods, high prices), developed so differently. Romania’ economy grew very fast, faster than that of any other Central or East European country, while the Czechoslovakian economy was one of the worst performing of Central and Eastern Europe. It is also telling that when economic conditions grew worse in the 1980s, the regime of Ceauşescu became less popular and eventually fell in 1989.  
Novotný did not have the support of the population. Most people (75%) supported Dubček. When a leader is that unpopular it is easier to oppose him or to demand change than when the leader is worshiped and praised everywhere. The last was the case with Ceauşescu. This was however not a spontaneous initiative from the Romanians. Ceauşescu deliberately developed a personality cult around himself and his wife. This strengthened his hold on the country. Novotný did not have this option because of his own past and that of Czechoslovakia. During the years of the personality cult around Stalin, Novotný had already been a party member and had taken part in the purges. The Czechoslovakians remembered those purges and would never accept a leadership cult again. One characteristic of Stalinism is thus missing in Czechoslovakia. Ceauşescu however did rule according to Stalinism, he made use of a personality cult, controlled the media thoroughly and he used the Securitate as a powerful weapon to fight every rebellion that might have surfaced. His nationalistic views also bound people to his rule. As we have already seen most of these things were lacking or at least less thoroughly carried out in Czechoslovakia. 
		
Cause	Czechoslovakia	Romania





Power of the personality cult	0	1
Contribution of ideology to communist rule	0	1

	So, why did Romania not experience a revolution? I think that it is clear that the most important reasons were the power of the personality cult, the contribution of ideology to communist rule, the popular support Ceauşescu enjoyed, the good economic conditions of his country in the 1960s and 1970s, the conformist spirit among Romanian intellectuals, the restrictive cultural policy Ceauşescu directed so that no deviant opinions could get known easily and the role of the Soviet Union which did not press as hard on Romania as it did on Czechoslovakia. Also important, but less easy to measure, was the fact that though workers and minorities both protested against the regime they could not form one bloc against it. Workers could not protest effectively because of the gap between them and other groups in society, especially intellectuals and minorities because there were many different ethnic minorities in Romania while there was one big homogenous group in Czechoslovakia. Ceauşescu also controlled the press almost completely, this meant that no deviant opinions could be published and the people stayed ignorant of many important facts. The iron fist of the security service also played an important role in Ceauşescu’s hold on power and without the party’s leading role in government and society his rule would not have been possible. 
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